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I. INTRODUCTION 
A user who gets sued becomes a defendant.1 My contribution to 
this symposium on international and comparative user rights in 
copyright explores how international intellectual property (IP) law 
protects the rights and interests of defendants in IP enforcement 
procedures.2 Procedural rights and safeguards are not a mainstream 
 
 1.  . . .or prosecuted. Of course not all defendants are the kinds of ‘user’ 
whose interests we would wish to protect. But some are. And in a context where 
many users are potential defendants, furthering the interests of defendants does 
further the interests of users. ‘Defendant’ is not precisely right as the term here: (1) 
in some cases, the ‘object’ of legal procedures is not alleged to be liable, but rather, 
in a position to assist a right holder in taking action against a wrongdoer (e.g. in a 
preliminary discovery action); (2) in other cases a person may be the object of 
administrative procedures. However, the more accurate ‘enforcees’ is too 
astoundingly ugly to use. See DENIS JAMES GALLIGAN, DUE PROCESS AND FAIR 
PROCEDURES: A STUDY OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 101–03 (1996) 
(introducing a general principle that a right is only taken seriously if there are 
procedures to protect it.  First order rights within a legal system justify a claim to 
such procedures as are necessary to protect and uphold those rights.  The litigant in 
a civil action has a right to procedures by which the law will be applied accurately 
to the facts, or at least that the contest between the parties be reasonably equal). 
 2.  Defendants are not the only ones with an interest in the framing of legal 
processes and remedies. Plaintiffs’ interests are discussed below. Moreover, the 
State is itself a stakeholder in enforcement systems with its own distinct interests, 
including at least: (1) ensuring the IP system serves intended policy purposes; and 
(2) value for money invested in enforcement (e.g. court systems, police, customs); 
as well as (3) promoting other public interests. 
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part of the discussion of user rights in IP, which tends to focus on 
exceptions and limitations. However, if we want IP law to account 
appropriately for interests beyond those of IP right holders, i.e. those 
of users, public institutions, and the society at large, we need to think 
about IP systems from start to end. This means examining all parts of 
the system, from the grant or recognition of rights, through rules 
determining the scope of rights, and the conduct of legal processes,3 
to provisional and final remedies.4 We need to think about how the 
framing of both procedures and remedies can protect broader public 
interests. 
This paper offers a mapping and analysis of a range of procedural 
safeguards found in the international legal framework governing IP 
enforcement. Within the broader realm of international law, IP is 
unusual in the extent to which international instruments address the 
details of domestic legal process in relation to private rights.5 
Therefore, IP provides an interesting case study in the interaction 
between international law and domestic legal process and remedies. 
International IP contains a broad range of procedural safeguards 
and limits on remedies. These include general principles, such as the 
requirement that enforcement measures should be fair and equitable, 
and that procedures provide for safeguards against abuse.6 There are 
 
 3.  This paper is concerned principally with legal processes which have the 
purpose of applying authoritative legal standards: chiefly, civil and criminal 
proceedings around IP enforcement, and equivalent administrative systems 
implicating enforcement of rights (e.g. seizure of goods at the border, which is 
typically an administrative process). Grant and revocation processes are of less 
(direct) interest here. See GALLIGAN, supra note 1, at 24-31 (asserting “processes 
are classified according to whether their purpose is: (i) to apply authoritative legal 
standards; (ii) to decide as the official thinks best; (iii) to reach agreement between 
the parties; (iv) to decide by voting; (v) to decide by fiat or decree . . . (vi) 
investigation and inquiry, and (vii) proceduralism and participation.”). 
 4.  See Carys Craig, The Evolution of Originality in Canadian Copyright Law: 
Authorship, Reward and the Public Interest, 2 OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 425, 425 
(2005) (arguing similarly that relying on exceptions to protect the public interest is 
too late: that public interest considerations must be considered at the stage of 
subsistence). 
 5.  Apart from specific contexts, such as within the European Union, the 
author is unaware of other areas of private law where procedures and remedies are 
similarly dealt with at a supra-national level; see X.E Kramer and C H van Rhee 
(eds) CIVIL LITIGATION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD (2012) (discussing the 
challenges of procedural harmonization within the European Union). 
 6.  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
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also detailed rules regarding the availability of remedies, the 
considerations relevant to making court orders, as well as specific 
built-in protections and rules that directly protect the interests of 
defendants in legal proceedings.7 These may seem prosaic, but in the 
real world of actual and prospective court proceedings, rules of 
evidence, standards and burdens of proof, the availability of 
provisional remedies, and final remedies are all important to actual 
and potential defendants.8 ‘What happens if I get sued?’ is an 
obvious question for anyone proposing to interact with IP-protected 
material. Thus, the framing of procedures and remedies can 
determine whether users like the transformative artist or the health 
NGO will fight or, quite rationally, fold at the threat of litigation. 
They affect the calculations of a risk-averse public institution 
considering digitizing their archive of wartime photographs and 
letters. Additionally, procedures govern results that matter from a 
public interest perspective: whether generic drugs risk being seized 
en route,9 or whether a website suddenly disappears.10 In other 
words, procedures and remedies can be as significant as the drafting 
of substantive IP law in determining how punitive IP rules are in 
practice.11 
 
art. 41 Apr. 15 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS] (“Procedures concerning 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable. They 
shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits 
or unwarranted delays.”). 
 7.  See infra Part III. 
 8.  See Dallas Buyers Club LLC v. iiNet Limited, No. 1051/2014, Federal 
Court of Australia [Fed. Ct. of Aust’l] (Apr. 7, 2015) (providing an example of a 
case where procedural safeguards prevented action being taken against potentially 
infringing individuals: the court refused to authorize discovery which would have 
identified alleged infringers as a result of a number of due process-related 
concerns). 
 9.  See Bryan Mercurio, ‘Seizing’ Pharmaceuticals in Transit: Analysing the 
WTO Dispute that Wasn’t, 61 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 389, 398, 406-07 (2012) 
(outlining India’s complaints over European seizures of generic pharmaceuticals, 
which were raised with the World Trade Organization but ultimately did not 
proceed to a decision). 
 10.  Annemarie Bridy, Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and 
the War on Piracy, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683, 687-717 (2014) (describing laws and 
systems by which the U.S. government has ‘seized’ domain names as a response to 
infringement). 
 11.  See Kimberlee Weatherall, Provocations and Challenges Concerning 
Enforcement and Civil Procedure in IP, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES: IS IP A LEX SPECIALIS? 195-96 (Graeme Dinwoodie 
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This paper also maps the development of safeguards over time, 
with a focus on international instruments involving the United States. 
The picture is simultaneously heartening and disturbing. On the 
positive side, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)12 sets out a detailed and mostly 
mandatory framework on IP enforcement that, while implementing 
an extensive and strong set of remedies, also explicitly respects due 
process, fair trial, and (to a lesser extent) the framing of appropriate 
remedies. TRIPS includes both high-level principles pertaining to 
due process and trial, and specific mandatory rules that ensure fair 
treatment for the objects of legal and administrative procedures.13 In 
relation to remedies, TRIPS requires their existence, but leaves room 
for legislatures and courts to adjust those remedies to serve the 
public interest and the exigencies of particular cases.14 In short, 
TRIPS contains many safeguards to protect defendant rights and 
interests. However, more troubling is the fact that, as this article 
shows, not all of these protections are repeated in more recent 
international IP instruments.15 The safeguards are disappearing, and 
we may risk losing the hard-won balance established in the 1990s. 
Part II of this paper outlines the importance of this project: the 
tendency to include more and more detailed rules relating to 
enforcement in international legal instruments, and to make IP 
litigation simpler and cheaper for IP owners. These trends make 
defendant safeguards more important. Part II also discusses whether 
procedural safeguards are an appropriate part of the discourse around 
user rights in copyright. Part III identifies and analyzes key 
procedural safeguards and limits on remedies found in the various 
international instruments. Part IV briefly maps the trends around 
procedural rules and safeguards in recent international instruments, 
and discusses the legal implications of the tendency to leave certain 
 
ed. 2015) [hereinafter Weatherall, Provocations and Challenges] (claiming that 
“the rules with the most impact on how punitive IP is in practice could well be 
rules of evidence, standards and burdens of proof, and provisional remedies, as 
well as the rules which govern the progress of cases and the conduct of trials”); see 
generally W. R. Cornish et al, Procedures and Remedies for Enforcing IPRS: The 
Proposed Directive, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 447, 448 (2003). 
 12.  See TRIPS, supra note 6. 
 13.  See id. Part III. 
 14.  See infra Part III.A. 
 15.  See infra Part IV.A. 
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safeguards out, and Part V concludes. Annexure 1 provides a table 
identifying the various safeguards and whether they are in, or out, of 
the international instruments discussed in this paper. 
II. WHY WE NEED TO PAY ATTENTION TO 
DEFENDANT SAFEGUARDS 
A. THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURAL AND  
REMEDIAL SAFEGUARDS 
It is important that we focus on safeguards in IP enforcement 
because developments in international IP law are simultaneously 
making protecting defendants more important while also putting 
them at greater risk. Under the shadow of an apparent IP 
infringement crisis, recent years have seen a massive growth in the 
number, scope, and geographic reach of international instruments 
requiring extensive IP protection, as well as civil and criminal 
enforcement of IP.16 This trend is neither smooth17 nor universal. By 
contrast, the World Intellectual Property Organization has had a 
significant focus on exceptions and limitations, which to date has 
seen the successful conclusion of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate 
Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually 
Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled.18 Nevertheless, it is an 
important and observable trend. 
The inclusion of detailed enforcement provisions in international 
agreements is a recent phenomenon. The treaties which provided the 
international IP framework for most of the 20
th
 Century, namely the 
1886 Berne Convention in copyright and the 1883 Paris Convention 
 
 16.  See Peter Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 
975 (2011); see also Kimberlee Weatherall, ACTA as a New Kind of International 
IP Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 839, 876 (2011) [hereinafter Weatherall, 
ACTA] (describing one IP enforcement treaty, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, and situating it as part of a more general trend). 
 17.  See LTC HARMS, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: A CASE BOOK 476-482 (2008) (discussing that the failure of ACTA is one 
example of a reversal of this trend). 
 18.  Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, 
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013 [hereinafter 
Marrakesh Treaty]. There are also ongoing discussions relating to both library use 
and educational use of copyright content, and, more broadly, there is WIPO’s 
Development Agenda. 
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in relation to industrial property, left general enforcement and 
remedial measures as (mostly) matters for national law.19 TRIPS 
changed this two decades ago by mandating a range of procedures 
and remedies in twenty articles relating to enforcement.20 It is worth 
pausing a moment to note how very remarkable this development is. 
Few treaties, and certainly few global treaties, would descend so far 
into domestic legal processes, so as to dictate, in detail, procedures 
and remedies to be accorded in an area of essentially private law. 
Outside the context of regional instruments, such as those within the 
European Union (EU), it is difficult to identify equivalent attempts to 
dictate court and administrative processes. 
As will become evident through the course of this paper, the 
TRIPS enforcement rules were less than IP owner lobbyists had 
sought, making them from a right holder perspective TRIPS’ 
“Achilles’ Heel”.21 The United States in particular has pushed to 
reinforce and extend these rules through subsequent agreements. In 
the early 2000s, a series of bilateral and regional preferential trade 
agreements negotiated by the United States (and EU) contained a 
scattergun collection of specific TRIPS-plus provisions on 
enforcement; the EU also developed its own regional text in the form 
of the EU IP Enforcement Directive.22 The text of the failed Anti-
 
 19.  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works, 
opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne 
Convention]; see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 
opened for signature Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]. There is one important exception: both conventions require that 
Member States give authorities the power to seize infringing copies: Berne 
Convention art. 16(1) and (2); art. 13(3)); Paris Convention art. 10, 10bis, 10ter. 
 20.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41-61 (outlining the general obligations, civil 
and administrative procedures and remedies, provisional measures, special 
requirements related to border measures and the criminal procedures associated 
with the enforcement of intellectual property rights). 
 21.  See David Lange & Jerome Reichman, Bargaining Around the TRIPS 
Agreement, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 34-39 (1998) (criticizing the 
shortcomings of the enforcement procedures in the TRIPS agreement). But see 
David Fitzpatrick, Negotiating for Hong Kong, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY NEGOTIATIONS 285, 289-
91 (Watal Jayashree & Antony Taubman eds. 2015) (praising the enforcement 
procedures in TRIPS. David Fitzpatrick was involved in the negotiation of the 
enforcement provisions). 
 22.  See Directive 2004/48 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 
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Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), concluded in late 2010, 
was more systematic and comprehensive.23 Today we appear to have 
entered what some are calling the Age of the Mega-regionals: 
proposed deep integration partnerships between countries or regions 
with a major share of world trade and foreign direct investment.24 
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP),25 concluded in late 
2015, would apply detailed enforcement obligations to countries in 
the Asia-Pacific constituting some 40% of global GDP and 25% of 
global trade.26 Other mega-regional agreements are currently under 
negotiation, namely the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP)27 and Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP).28 Both (if concluded) seem likely to include at 
 
16, 24 [hereinafter EU Directive 2004/48]. 
 23.  See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature Oct. 1, 
2011 (not in force) [hereinafter ACTA] (setting out a range of obligations relating 
to IP enforcement). ACTA was negotiated and signed by Australia, Canada, the 
EU, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and the 
United States. The European Parliament rejected ACTA, and it appears that 
ratification has not been actively pursued in other signatories. The ACTA has not 
reached the number of ratifications required to bring it into force. 
 24.  See Tomas First, What Are Mega-Regional Trade Agreements? WORLD 
ECON. FORUM (July 9, 2014), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/07/trade-
what-are-megaregionals (defining the concept of mega-regionals). 
 25.  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement between the Government of Austl. 
and the Governments of: Brunei Darussalam, Can., Chile, Japan, Malay., Mex., 
N.Z., Peru, Sing., the United States and Vietnam, opened for signature Feb. 4, 
2016 (not in force), ch.18, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/ 
tpp-full-text (last visited June 26, 2016) [hereinafter TPP]. 
 26.  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/pages/trans-pacific-
partnership-agreement-tpp.aspx  (last visited June 26, 2016) (describing the size 
and importance of the markets covered by the TPP). 
 27.  See generally Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP), 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/ttip (last visited June 
26, 2016) [hereinafter TTIP] (describing the TTIP as a trade agreement being 
negotiated between the United States and the European Union). 
 28.  RCEP is under negotiation between the ten Member States of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam) and the six states with which ASEAN has existing FTAs (Australia, 
China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand); See generally Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND TRADE, http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/rcep/pages/regional-comprehensiv 
e-economic-partnership.aspx (last visited June 26, 2016) (describing the 
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least some enforcement-related provisions.29 
As noted, the process of expanding IP enforcement rules is far 
from smooth. One reason for undertaking the plurilateral 
negotiations that led to ACTA was that efforts to initiate detailed 
enforcement discussions at the multilateral level, in both the World 
Intellectual Property Organization and World Trade Organization, 
had stalled in the face of resistance particularly from developing 
countries.30 Despite being negotiated among a ‘coalition of the 
willing’, ACTA failed to garner support sufficient to bring it into 
force.31 The TTIP, TPP, and RCEP are all beset by controversy, and 
at the time of writing it is unclear which, if any, will eventually come 
into force. Nevertheless, an explicit part of the TPP/TTIP/RCEP 
agenda is to set future standards for other future negotiations. One 
negotiator at the 2016 Fordham IP Conference described the TPP IP 
chapter as ‘the new TRIPS.’32 These texts also reveal what will be 
sought in future lobbying efforts and negotiations: despite its failure 
to come into force, text from ACTA has surfaced in subsequent 
negotiations, including for the TPP. Therefore, these initiatives 
warrant critical attention. And every one of them contains extensive 
enforcement provisions, requiring that the law of Member States 
recognize a broad range of remedies and increase general deterrence 
through the growth of punitive measures as a common element in 
civil remedies.33  In this context, defendant safeguards are clearly 
 
membership and purposes of RCEP). 
 29.  See 2015 Oct 15 version: RCEP IP Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, 
http://keionline.org/node/2472 (last visited June 26, 2016) [hereinafter RCEP 
Draft] (mandating, in this leaked draft text, a range of enforcement provisions). 
 30.  See generally Kimberlee Weatherall, Politics, Compromise, Text and the 
Failures of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 229 
(2011). 
 31.  See Weatherall, ACTA, supra note 16, at 893-94 (positing that perceptions 
toward ACTA have been widely negative despite improvements in transparency 
and content. This “bad publicity” is due to the early exclusivity of ACTA and a 
lack of early public involvement). 
 32.  See Kimberlee Weatherall, Intellectual Property in the TPP: Is Chapter 18 
the New TRIPS?, draft paper on file with author. 
 33.  See, e.g., TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74 (requiring pre-fixed or additional 
damages), art. 18.74(9) (referring to the need for deterrence), and art. 18.74(12) 
(detailing the destruction of infringing goods without compensation, as well as 
implements used in creating infringements); See also Mark C. Stafford & Mark 
Warr, The Reconceptualization of General and Specific Deterrence, 30 
CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 123 (1993) (describing the difference between 
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important. 
Another impact of these international instruments is to adjust 
procedural rules to make it easier to prosecute an infringement case. 
For example, various treaty provisions seek to reduce the need to 
prove elements of the case by presuming that copyright subsists by 
proving it was authored by the person identified on published 
copies;34 these provisions also provide for fixed or quasi-fixed 
damages (statutory damages) that can be claimed without proof of 
harm.35 Recent treaties also mandate that certain measures of 
damages (such as retail price) be taken into account when assessing 
damages,36 and seek to increase the efficiency of enforcement 
through the use of provisional or pre-emptive seizure.37 Some of 
these developments respond to genuine difficulties experienced by IP 
right holders in effectively enforcing their rights against wrongdoers; 
others respond to barriers that smaller enterprises in particular 
encounter in dealing with the IP system. But an inevitable effect of 
making acquisition and enforcement of rights easier and provisional 
and final remedies stronger, is to increase the risk of misuse and 
 
specific deterrence, which refers to the narrower objective of deterring the 
individual or entity that is before the court from re-offending, versus general 
deterrence which aims at deterring the population as a whole). 
 34.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.72(1) (requiring a presumption of 
authorship); see also Berne Convention, supra note 19, art. 15 (applying a similar 
presumption). The presumption of authorship addresses the difficulties sometimes 
experienced in documenting how copyright content was created, in a system in 
which compulsory registration is not allowed under Berne art. 5(2), which is 
imported into TRIPS via Article 9. 
 35.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74(6)(b) (requiring statutory damages); 
Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 446 (2009) (discussing 
how statutory or pre-fixed damages were motivated in part by a desire to help 
overcome difficulties that copyright owners in particular experience in providing 
solid evidence of harm caused by copyright infringement). 
 36.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.4; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 9.1; see 
also United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 
17.11.6(b), Jan. 1, 2005, 43 I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter AUSFTA]; EU Directive 
2004/48, supra note 22, art. 13.1 (mandating, in each case, that certain measures of 
harm, such as retail price, be taken into account when assessing damages). 
 37.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74(17) (requiring provisional measures in 
relation to anti-circumvention laws); art. 18.75 (mandating provisional measures 
including seizure of alleged infringements), 18.76 (requiring measures to allow 
seizure of alleged infringements at the border). 
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opportunism.38 Just as not every defendant is harmless or well-
intentioned (some are counterfeiters), not every plaintiff is an 
innovator or creator asserting clear and justifiable IP rights against a 
competitor who is undermining their incentives to invest in more 
invention and creation. Some are trolls.39 
Procedural safeguards and limits on remedies can dramatically 
influence both the dynamics of enforcement proceedings and their 
outcomes. This is demonstrated by the recent proceedings in the 
Australian Federal Court in Dallas Buyers Club LLC v iiNet Ltd.40 
This case involved the extended right of information, provided for in 
many recent international instruments, which allows right holders to 
seek access to information in the possession of a non-infringing third 
party such as an online service provider that may identify an alleged 
infringer.41 Under Anglo-Australian common law this order has 
 
 38.  Cf. Kimberlee Weatherall, Ignoring the Science: What We Know About 
Patents Suggests Dire Consequences from ACTA and the TPPA, in SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: BALANCING COMPETING 
INTERESTS (Bryan Mercurio & Ni Kuei-Jung eds. 2013) [hereinafter Weatherall, 
Ignoring the Science] (making this argument in a patent context). 
 39.  See Michael Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-competitive 
Intellectual Property, 44 B.C.L. REV. 510, 520 (2003) (regarding factors that may 
encourage ‘troll-like behaviour’); see also John Allison et al., Extreme Value or 
Trolls on Top – the Characteristics of the Most-litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1, 32-33 (2009) (highlighting that remedies such as injunctions and damages 
for profits lost are derived from consideration of the status of the enforcing party as 
an active competitor in the market, which trolls are not); see generally Hugh 
Laddie, The Insatiable Appetite for Intellectual Property Rights, 61 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBLEMS 415, 415-16 (2008) (offering a brief overview of patent troll 
proliferation and the reasons for their effectiveness). 
 40.  See Dallas Buyers Club LLC v. iiNet Limited, [2015] FCA 838 (holding 
that it is impermissible for plaintiffs to demand access to users’ uploading activity 
or to demand arbitrary, unnamed damages. Set the precedent that in order for 
future rights holders to obtain preliminary discovery against ISPs they must follow 
a stricter set of guidelines and clearly identify the damages sought. Note that 
because Australia has no constitutional or statutory bill of rights, the Federal Court 
was entirely reliant on principles relating to fair trial and due process); see also 
Golden Eye Int’l. v. Telefonica U.K. Ltd. [2012] EWHC 723 (addressing similar 
issues in the UK); Voltage Pictures LLC v. John Doe, [2015] F.R. 1364 (Can. 
Ont.) (holding similarly that access to ISP information must be closely monitored 
by the court to protect the privacy rights of users). 
 41.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47 (setting out an optional ‘right of 
information’ confined to information in the hands of the infringer). ACTA contains 
a similar optional provision in art. 11, as does the TPP in art. 18.74. An ISP is not 
necessarily an infringer. But a right to information in the hands of a non-infringer 
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historically been referred to as a Norwich Pharmacal order,42 or 
preliminary discovery.43 The case involved an application by Dallas 
Buyers Club LLC (DBC), which held copyright in the film Dallas 
Buyers Club, for preliminary discovery against six internet service 
providers (ISPs), and sought the names and addresses of the account 
holders of 4,726 IP addresses it had detected BitTorrenting the film.44 
The ISPs opposed the application on the basis that it would allow 
DBC to engage in ‘speculative invoicing.’45 Justice Perram held that 
the right holders were entitled to the information, but stayed the 
order to produce to supervise its use.46 He foreshadowed imposing 
conditions meant to protect the privacy of the affected account 
holders47 and limit the use to which the information could be put; as a 
 
is embodied in more recent instruments, including Article 8 of the EU IP 
Enforcement Directive); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 27.4 (addressing 
online service providers’ ability to identify infringing subscribers); see also TPP, 
supra note 27, art. 18.82.7 (indicating a right to obtain information identifying 
infringing subscribers, although not all parties would be bound to provide such a 
right; the Canadian annex 18-E does not include an equivalent provision); see also 
AUSFTA, supra note 36, art. 17.11.29(b)(xi) (mandating that both the US and 
Australia provide for an extended right to information). 
 42.  See Norwich Pharmacal Co v. Customs & Excise Commissioners, [1973] 
UKHL 6, [1974] AC (HL) 133 (holding that when a third party has information 
about unlawful conduct, a court can compel them to reveal that information and 
assist the person whose rights have been infringed). 
 43.  See Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth of Aust.) Order 7.22 (allowing order 
for discovery to ascertain description of respondent, thus allowing rights holders to 
protect their interests). Australia does not have a specialized mechanism for 
seeking such information in its copyright law, but relies on pre-existing court 
procedures. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (allowing a copyright holder to petition the 
court to issue a subpoena to the internet service providers, ordering the release of 
user information). 
 44.  See Dallas Buyers Club, supra note 40, ¶¶ 84-87, ¶ 93 (holding that 
litigation could continue against ISP users, however the court imposed strict 
procedural safeguards to protect the privacy interests of users). 
 45.  See Golden Eye, supra note 40, ¶ 36 (describing ‘speculative invoicing’ as 
involving the sending of letters to internet subscribers whose IP address is alleged 
to have been used for copyright infringement and whose names and addresses have 
been obtained by means of preliminary discovery. The internet subscriber is 
requested to pay a substantial sum bearing no relation to the actual damage caused 
or costs, without the sender seeking to confirm that the internet subscriber was the 
person responsible for infringement). 
 46.  See Dallas Buyers Club, supra note 40. 
 47.  In fact, Perram J never laid out the necessary privacy protections in detail: 
the order lapsed before any such details were established. See Dallas Buyers Club, 
1051/2014, ¶¶ 84-87, ¶ 93 (holding that the privacy of users is of utmost 
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preliminary step, these conditions required the applicants to produce 
drafts of their proposed communications with alleged infringers.48 
Courts in both the UK and Canada have imposed similar 
conditions.49 Justice Perram refused to approve the drafts supplied, 
which referred to additional punitive damages that might or might 
not be awarded in any subsequent legal proceedings: this uncertainty 
was problematic in the context of letters to users.50 The claimants 
were unable to provide a letter that would both satisfy the judge and 
achieve their own goals, and the order to produce information 
ultimately expired without the stay ever being lifted. 
B. THE ROLE OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AND REMEDIAL 
LIMITS IN USER RIGHTS DISCOURSE 
From one perspective, the result in Dallas Buyers Club thwarted 
the effective enforcement of copyright rights and hence undermined 
the goals of international copyright law.51 An alternative assessment 
is that the case demonstrates how procedural safeguards can temper 
the stringency of over-extensive copyright rights.52 The gap between 
these perspectives raises a fundamental question concerning the 
legitimacy of treating procedural safeguards and limits on remedies 
as a user rights issue. When applying remedies, should we only be 
concerned with enforcement of substantive law, or can goals of 
 
importance and therefore mandating that the court closely monitor the plaintiff’s 
correspondence with users). 
 48.  See id. 
 49.  See Voltage Pictures LLC v. John Doe [2015] F.C. 1364 (Can.) (holding 
that letters to potential defendants must first be submitted to the court to protect the 
privacy rights of users); Golden Eye Int’l. v. Telefonica U.K. Ltd. [2012] EWHC 
723 (imposing a range of conditions to protect users). 
 50.  See Dallas Buyers Club, supra note 40, ¶¶ 84-87, ¶ 93 (naming additional 
punitive damages as “impermissible demands” that would not be allowed to 
continue. The court allowed litigation for compensatory damages for the initial 
infringement). Note that an implication of this is that the result might have been 
different had Australian law provided for statutory damages. 
 51.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.1; TPP, supra 
note 27, art.18.71.1 (highlighting the obligation to provide ‘effective’ 
enforcement); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 27.1; TPP, supra note 25, art. 
18.82.1 (mandating the obligation to provide for effective enforcement in the 
online context). 
 52.  See Dallas Buyers Club LLC v. iiNet Limited, supra note 40 (holding 
allows for litigation to continue while procedural safeguards aim to prevent 
frivolous lawsuits). 
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copyright law such as promoting public access to knowledge and 
culture be considered alongside the concerns of copyright owners 
potentially harmed by infringement? 
A user rights perspective regarding procedural safeguards and 
limits on remedies could proceed as follows. Limits on both the 
availability of enforcement procedures and the remedies granted are 
necessary to ensure a balanced system of rights in response both to 
the extension of stronger remedies and procedures in international 
instruments and to the structure of IP rights. IP legislation frequently 
grants the same strong exclusive rights and extended term to a broad 
array of subject matters that we may need to treat differently in 
practice.53 For example, copyright law confers the same exclusive 
rights and the same 100+ years of protection to J. K. Rowling’s 
Harry Potter series and yesterday’s email to the Dean. However, we 
would not expect the same level of damages to follow from 
quantitatively similar levels of infringement of both,54 nor the same 
procedures. Preliminary seizure of alleged infringing copies of Harry 
Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone and related evidence might be 
appropriate pending legal action (at least where the infringer appears 
to be operating commercially), but it would be much harder to justify 
preliminary seizure of computers allegedly used to infringe an e-
mail. Furthermore, because IP rights are proprietary in nature, prima 
facie liability for infringement is often determined without reference 
 
 53.  See Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1575 (2003) (describing the general phenomenon of IP 
rights which do not differentiate between subject matters, but also discussing 
mechanisms in patent law – policy levers – which enable some tailoring of rights); 
See Michael Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual 
Property Law, 55 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 845 (2006) (arguing that 
intellectual property law protects the owner of each patented invention or 
copyrighted work of authorship with a largely uniform set of exclusive rights). 
 54.  See Patrick Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 306, 328 (2014) (arguing that compensatory damages 
designed to redress harm suffered would be set at a different figure in the case of 
infringement of these different materials – but ‘damages for monetary harm 
suffered’ is the same remedy regardless of the difference in the final figure. The 
point is more pressing however with non-compensatory remedies: punitive 
damages might be justified in one case but not the other; other remedies such as 
seizure and forfeiture of implements used in making infringing copies might also 
be appropriate in one case but not the other). 
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to intent or mental state.55 In short, describing certain conduct as 
‘infringement,’ or a person as an ‘infringer,’ tells you very little 
about the nature of the act, the harm it causes, or the moral 
culpability involved. In a context where not all infringements are 
created equal, we need mechanisms for tempering the otherwise 
undifferentiated impact of substantive IP laws.56 
An advocate of user rights would also recognize the need to think 
beyond exceptions and limitations, which while important in 
tailoring the law’s responses to infringing acts, is not a complete 
answer to over-extensive IP rights. Leaving public interest 
considerations until a person has already been branded a free-rider 
and prima facie infringer, and requiring them to beg for forgiveness, 
may be too late if the overall goal is to balance interests in the IP 
system and give recognition to public interests in access to and reuse 
of content.57 Exceptions place the onus on the defendant and burden 
them with legal costs, not all of which are recoverable.58 As a result, 
exceptions do not wholly overcome the risk for an impecunious 
defendant who, faced with costs and procedures that may be stacked 
against them, will settle unmeritorious claims or potentially avoid 
questionable activity altogether if sufficiently risk averse.59 Further, 
in the many countries which have specific (rather than open-ended) 
copyright exceptions, factors relevant to the perceived justice of a 
claim or penalty, such as the defendant’s mental state or intentions, 
the public benefit, and the degree of harm to the IP owner, may not 
 
 55.  This is true in the case of direct infringement; contributory and vicarious 
liability in the US, or authorization liability in Australia and the UK, does take into 
account the mental state or the actor. See id. (outlining the widespread and 
orthodox belief that copyright infringement is a strict liability tort, but arguing that 
this characterization is questionable). 
 56.  Re the use of various ‘policy levers’ to create differentiation within the IP 
system. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 53, 1641 (explaining how, in theory, the 
United States applies a uniform patent system even though technological 
innovation is anything but uniform). 
 57.  See Craig, supra note 4, 435–36 (arguing that public interest must play a 
role in determining the substance of copyright, if we are to balance the interests of 
the producer and the interests of the public at large). 
 58.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 53, at 1638. 
 59.  See Burk & Lemley, supra note 53, at 1624; see also Michael J. Meurer, 
supra note 39, at 512-516 (outlining the various risks facing defendants in IP 
litigation, and noting that certain problems – like weak but credible plaintiffs, and 
uncertain rights – are more prevalent in IP litigation). 
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be considered when determining whether an exception applies.60 
Thus, in order to ensure that copyright enforcement serves the 
purposes of copyright law, the public interest, and the interests of 
justice to the infringer, we may require mechanisms other than 
exceptions for adjusting legal consequences of infringement. 
Another reason consideration of procedures and remedies might be 
attractive for those concerned with user rights is a practical one: 
international IP law imposes more constraints on States drafting 
exceptions compared to the application of remedies. Most exceptions 
across the major areas of IP law, which includes copyright, patent, 
and trademark, must meet one or more formulations of a three-step 
test.61 As discussed below, enforcement provisions in the treaties are 
drafted quite differently and more flexibly. 
For all these reasons, a user rights advocate might argue that states 
should be able to condition the availability of enforcement 
procedures and remedies according to their own conception of 
societal interests in access and reuse of content, and courts and other 
decision-makers also ought to be allowed to consider such issues in 
 
 60.  Although the U.S. copyright exception for fair use (17 U.S.C. §107) takes 
into account the impact of a defendant’s conduct on the market for the protected 
work, many exceptions in countries like Australia and Europe have no provision 
for considering this issue. See Austl. Law Reform Comm’n, Copyright and the 
Digital Economy, 23, 88 (Nov. 2013), http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/ 
files/pdfs/publications/final_report_alrc_122_2nd_december_2013_.pdf 
(reviewing Australia’s specific exceptions regime in copyright and pointing out 
that while the fair use defence asks the ‘right questions’ – whether a use impacts 
on the copyright owner’s market; and whether there is social benefit – Australia’s 
exceptions leave no room for these considerations); Council Directive 2001/29, 
2001 O.J. (L 167) 10(EC), # 5 [hereinafter EU Directive 2001/29]  (setting out an 
exhaustive list of exceptions which apply to certain copyright exclusive rights in 
the European Union). 
 61.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 13 (setting out the three-step test in 
copyright); c.f. Berne, supra note 19, art 9 (also setting out a three step test for 
copyright, but applying that test only to works (not including sound recordings or 
broadcasts), only to the reproduction right and requiring consideration of the 
legitimate interests of the author, where TRIPS art 13 requires consideration of the 
legitimate interests of the right holder). The three-step test in the World Intellectual 
Property Organization Copyright Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1996, 36 
I.L.M. 63 (WCT) (art 10.1) applies to works and protects authors’ interests; the 
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
opened for signature Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (WPPT) (art 16.2) applies to 
sound recordings and performances and protects the right holder). 
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framing appropriate orders in particular cases.62 However, opponents 
of such views – such as advocates of strong copyright – might 
counter that debates over the appropriate scope of IP rights ought to 
be addressed by the legislature when determining the scope of rights, 
as opposed to in an ad hoc manner by courts.63 The legislature is 
arguably better equipped to consider the various stakeholders and 
determine the settings in substantive IP law, which will best promote 
the interests of society. On this view, once the substantive law of 
copyright has been fixed, the goal of legal procedure is only the 
accurate application of copyright law to the facts, and remedies are 
concerned only with the vindication of copyright owners’ duly 
recognized rights. 
In relation to legal process, this paper is not the place to delve into 
the vast and venerable scholarly literature considering the role and 
purposes of legal procedure and its relationship to justice and to 
substantive law.64 A body of well-established legal theory holds that 
correct application of the substantive law to the facts is not the only 
goal or value in legal procedure.65 Several layers of values are 
reflected in legal processes.66 These include ensuring that substantive 
law (i.e. copyright) is accurately applied67 and other values such as 
the following: standards of right treatment for individuals; ensuring 
equal treatment and respect for all persons involved in legal 
proceedings;68 and, at least in common law systems, ensuring that 
 
 62.  See Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 
TEX. L. R. 517 (2014) (arguing for the consideration of public policy in framing 
remedies in patent law, as it has been largely ignored thus far). 
 63.  See Mark Mckenna & Mark A. Lemley, The Scope of IP Rights, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (presenting this as a possible argument, but 
presenting an overall argument for court procedures to determine the scope of IP 
rights, drawing inspiration from the Markman model in U.S. patent litigation). 
 64.  The role of legal process has been a core concern of many of the great 
legal theorists, including Jeremy Bentham, HLA Hart, Rawls, Finnis, and 
Dworkin. See generally Galligan, supra note 1, (reviewing relevant literature). 
 65.  See id. (finding this to be a common, albeit not universal view: there have 
been scholars, such as Jeremy Bentham who have argued that the sole purpose of 
procedural law is to enforce substantive law). 
 66.  See id. at 6 (setting out a model for thinking about processes, reflecting 
different values at different ‘layers’). 
 67.  See id. at 58-59 (iterating that this reflects more than one goal in itself: 
achieving the goals of the substantive law, and to serving a more general and 
fundamental principle that people will be treated according to law). 
 68.  See generally id. at Ch. 2 (discussing a range of values relevant to 
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persons subject to legal proceedings have the opportunity and 
capacity to participate in those processes.69 Some of these values are 
recognized as part of the framework of human right to a fair trial 
recognized in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)70 and in other human rights instruments.71 
At times, these other values will be more important than correct 
application of copyright law. One can agree or disagree whether the 
scenario in Dallas Buyers Club was an example where the courts’ 
obligation to ensure fair use of procedures correctly trumped the 
copyright owners’ desire for effective and efficient enforcement. 
However, the fact that information was denied, meaning the IP 
owner could not locate infringers to take action against them, is not 
necessarily a failure of legal process, or unfair treatment of the 
copyright owner. 
Nevertheless, it might be argued that even if general process 
values, such as fairness, equal treatment, and absence of bias, are 
legitimate concerns for the courts, user and societal interests in 
copyright, such as access to content and its reuse for worthwhile 
public purposes, are not. On this view, concerns that copyright 
protects too much, is too easily acquired, or treats as infringement 
activities the social value of which outweighs any harm to the 
copyright owner, are irrelevant to framing IP enforcement 
procedures. Such an argument would be inconsistent, however, with 
international IP law. TRIPS, ACTA, and the TPP all explicitly 
reaffirm that: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social 
 
procedure). 
 69.  R. S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes – A Plea for 
‘Process Values’, 60 CORNELL L.R.  1 (1974); Lawrence Solum, Procedural 
Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004); see Galligan, supra note 1, at 100 
(discussing the value of participation as a value in legal processes). 
 70.  See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (including also the notion of 
“innocent until proven guilty” and several other due process rights many deem 
fundamental). 
 71.  See, e.g., Summers, supra note 69, at 1. 
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and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.72 
In other words, it is legitimate to consider a full range of interests 
and stakeholders in framing and applying enforcement provisions (at 
least within the bounds of any mandatory language).73 Broader public 
interests in access are reflected in the fact that provisions sometimes 
restrict remedies that apply to institutions such as public libraries, 
museums, and archives.74 While a state clearly could take the 
position that its substantive copyright law strikes all the relevant 
balances, and hence procedures and remedies ought to apply 
universally, another state could equally take a different view. 
It is also notable that both international and domestic IP laws 
explicitly take into account policy issues close to the heart of 
copyright owners, such as the need to deter infringement and provide 
incentives for creativity. For example, international instruments 
enjoin Member States to ensure that enforcement includes ‘remedies 
which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.’75 Domestic 
copyright law in Australia makes a number of remedies with a 
punitive element, in which the remedy is conditional on 
consideration of other aspects of blameworthiness of the defendant 
as well as the need to deter other infringers.76 If it is legitimate to 
 
 72.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 7; see also TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.2; ACTA, 
supra note 23, art. 2.3 (incorporating TRIPS art. 7). 
 73.  See generally infra Part III. A. 
 74.  See, e.g., TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.68.1 (allowing Member States to limit 
the criminal liability for circumvention of technological protection measures by 
public interest institutions such as non-profit libraries, museums, archives, 
educational institutions, and public non-commercial broadcasting entities). 
 75.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.1; see TPP, 
supra note 25, art. 18.71.1. Note that ‘deterrence’ here could be interpreted to refer 
only to specific deterrence – that is, deterring the particular infringer from 
engaging in further infringements. Domestic systems around the world however 
also explicitly take into account general deterrence; see also Austl. Law Reform 
Comm’n, Copyright and the Digital Economy, 122 (Nov. 2013) (Austl.) (stating 
that in awarding additional (i.e. punitive) damages, the court is required to take 
into account ‘the need to deter similar infringements of copyright’); see also Panel 
Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights,, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) ¶¶. 7.672, 7.679 [hereinafter US-
China Panel Report] (outlining third party submissions to the WTO in relation to 
the dispute between China and the United States over IP enforcement which 
argued that deterrence in this context meant general deterrence). 
 76.  See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (stating that in awarding additional (i.e. 
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take into account some aspects of copyright policy in framing 
remedies – especially the interest in ensuring incentives for creation 
by deterring widespread infringement – then it must be legitimate to 
take into account the full range of public interests in copyright, 
including by recognizing any public benefits arising from infringing 
use. The position taken by user rights advocates is that concerns with 
appropriate access to, and reuse of copyright content for a variety of 
social and public purposes are as much goals of the copyright system 
as the protection of creators, and the provision of incentives for 
investment in creativity.77 Opponents could reject this premise, but 
such rejection would fly in the face of widespread recognition by 
governments and in treaty text that the goals of copyright extend 
beyond supporting creativity.78 
III. A PRELIMINARY MAPPING OF DEFENDANT 
SAFEGUARDS AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
If you look carefully and with a broad conception of what kinds of 
things can operate as safeguards to protect the interests of individuals 
and companies who become the objects of IP enforcement 
 
punitive) damages, the court must consider the flagrancy of the infringement (s 
115(4)(b)(i)) and the conduct of the defendant following infringement or the 
allegation of infringement (s 115(4)(b)(ib)). 
 77.  Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social 
Values in Intellectual Property, 68 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 841, 848-849 
(1993) (“The point is not merely that the individual rights of authors must be 
balanced against the social good. The Constitution stipulates that authors’ rights 
are created to serve the social good, so any balancing must be done within the 
overall context of the public good, i.e., between the specific aspect of the public 
good that is served by intellectual property (‘the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts’) and other aspects of the public good such as the progressive effects of the 
free circulation of ideas”). 
 78.  See Michael Blakeney, Guidebook On Enforcement Of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Intellectual Prop. Research Inst., (2005), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122641.pdf (discussing the 
argument that broader public interests, such as access and reuse, are not a 
legitimate concern of the copyright system.) It seems unlikely, however, that such 
an argument would be mounted in the face of numerous multilateral treaties, which 
affirm the relevance of broader public interests, including most obviously TRIPS 
Articles 7 and 8, but also recent multilateral efforts such as the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works 
for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled, 2014 
ATNIF 15 (not in force)). 
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procedures, you will find many relevant rules, principles, and even 
drafting styles scattered through various international IP instruments 
which address enforcement-related issues: multilateral (TRIPS), 
plurilateral (ACTA79/TPP), regional (the EU IP Enforcement 
Directive), and numerous bilateral agreements. These safeguards 
include the following, discussed in this section:80 
1. The discretionary structure of the enforcement provisions; 
2. Guarantees of fair and equitable process; 
3. The principles of proportionality and effectiveness; 
4. Other specific procedural rules: 
Rights of review; 
Rights to have measures expire or be revoked; 
Rights to compensation for harm caused by measures wrongfully 
imposed; and 
5. Safeguards against abuse of rights and abuse of process. 
It is important to note that some defendant safeguards are stated at 
the level of general principle, while others are very specific.81 For 
example, TRIPS includes a general obligation to ensure that 
enforcement procedures are ‘fair and equitable;’82 it also specifies 
that seizures of allegedly infringing goods at the border must be 
released unless proceedings on the merits are commenced within 10 
working days, extendable once.83 Both general and specific 
 
 79.  See generally ACTA, supra note 23. The informed reader may wonder 
why this paper discusses ACTA, which has not come into force and looks unlikely 
to do so: supra note 23. ACTA is nevertheless worthy of analysis as the most 
recent negotiation on enforcement in particular between the United States and EU, 
meaning that it potentially foreshadows the Trans-Atlantic Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) under negotiation between the United States and EU. The ACTA text also 
influenced the TPP IP negotiations. 
 80.  Note that the focus of this paper is on safeguards for defendant interests, as 
more relevant to this symposium and user rights in IP. There are many safeguards 
throughout the various international instruments promoting plaintiff interests, and a 
number of the safeguards discussed in this section are equally applicable to 
plaintiffs and defendants. 
 81.  Guarantees of fair and equitable process, and principles of proportionality 
and effectiveness, discussed below, are stated at a high level of generality. More 
specific safeguards include rights of compensation, also discussed further below. 
 82.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.2. 
 83.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 55. 
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safeguards are important, for while specific safeguards provide 
unambiguous bright line rules that are easy to implement, due 
process and the principles pertaining to what constitutes a fair trial 
are dynamic concepts which can evolve over time.84 The question 
addressed in this Part is how these specific rules and general 
principles protect defendant rights and empower states and domestic 
courts to achieve justice in particular cases – and what has been 
happening to these safeguards in more recent texts. 
A. THE DISCRETIONARY STRUCTURE OF THE IP ENFORCEMENT 
PROVISIONS 
Current international IP enforcement provisions are almost 
universally drafted in a very particular style to require that national 
courts have the authority to take certain actions or make certain 
orders. For example, TRIPS article 45.1 (Damages) states: 
1. The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer 
to pay the right holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the 
right holder has suffered because of an infringement of that person’s 
intellectual property right by an infringer who knowingly, or with 
reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity.85 
All the enforcement provisions in TRIPS and many in recent 
international instruments follow this formula, requiring that courts 
and tribunals ‘have the authority’ to make orders.86 This is not an 
obligation to exercise authority in every case.87 It is relatively rare for 
the international provisions to set down when such authority ought to 
be exercised or what limits a State must or could place on the 
 
 84.  See James Spigelman, The Truth Can Cost Too Much: The Principle of a 
Fair Trial, 78 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 29, 41 (2004) (noting that the principle of a fair 
trial allows courts to remain dynamic in determining what is regarded as fair, 
especially in a criminal trial). 
 85.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art 45.1 (emphasis added); see also ACTA, supra 
note 23, art. 9.1-2, 9.4-5; TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.3 (providing similar 
damages provisions). 
 86.  ACTA, supra at note 23, art. 8.1; see TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.2-3 
(establishing obligations to provide for provisional measures drafted in similar 
terms), art. 18.74.2 (stating the power to issue injunctions in similar terms); see 
generally TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 44.1, 50.1-3. 
 87.  See US-China Panel Report, supra note 75, at ¶ 8.1; see also Appellate 
Body Report, United States—Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
1998 , WT/DS176/AB/R (2 January 2002). 
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exercise of such authority.88 
This is a deliberate part of the design of enforcement provisions. 
The open-textured drafting ensures that these enforcement provisions 
accommodate a wide range of judicial and administrative systems, 
and avoid the creation of a distinct procedural and remedial system 
applied only to IP cases within the overall legal system of Member 
States.89 Many domestic court systems will have well-established 
principles to guide the legal process and the application of remedies; 
these principles generally traverse multiple areas of law. This 
drafting also represents a compromise between states who wanted to 
promote genuinely effective enforcement, and states concerned with 
preventing interference of international legal text, or WTO dispute 
settlement decisions, into the details of domestic legal, judicial, and 
penal systems. 
The effect of drafting provisions in this way is to dictate the 
availability, not the application, of procedures and remedies in 
domestic courts. Although this does not directly guarantee 
safeguards for defendants, it does enable a State interested in 
promoting a balanced IP system to implement such safeguards. How 
far a State could go in taking advantage of this flexibility is a subject 
of some dispute. For example, there has been debate about whether 
provisions requiring courts to have the power to award compensatory 
 
 88.  Some provisions have some guidance. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 
50.2 (specifying circumstances where provisional measures may be appropriate 
inaudita altera parte: namely, where delay is ‘likely to cause irreparable harm to 
the right holder’, or where there is a ‘demonstrable risk of evidence being 
destroyed’). 
 89.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.5 and TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71.4(a) 
(providing that obligations pertaining to IP enforcement do ‘not create any 
obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general’); see also 
TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 1.1; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 2.1 TPP, supra note 25, 
art. 18.5 (providing that each member state is free to determine the appropriate 
method of implementing IP treaty provisions within its own legal system and 
practice. Drafting that ensures flexibility in the application of procedures and 
remedies is consistent with this principle); see William R. Cornish et al., 
Procedures and Remedies For Enforcing IPRs: The European Commission’s 
Proposed Directive, 20 EUR. INTELL. PROP. R. 448 (2003) (arguing that an 
important consideration here is that principles should be developed consistently 
across a legal system – i.e. the same principles should govern the application of 
procedures and remedies across IP and other kinds of private law such as contract, 
tort, or corporate law). 
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damages and injunctions for IP infringement90 require that those 
remedies be available in all cases of infringement, or whether the 
State can carve out certain cases. For example, in the U.S. Patents 
Act, damages and injunctions are not available against a medical 
practitioner (or related health entity) where the medical practitioner’s 
performance of a medical activity constitutes an infringement of a 
valid patent.91 Some commentators have argued that this provision is 
inconsistent with remedial provisions like those found in TRIPS or 
the TPP, or would be, except for text in those treaties that allows the 
exclusion of patents for medical methods.92 
 
 
 
 
 
These debates are important, but cannot be resolved here.93 
Nevertheless, even if a state cannot entirely exclude remedies, the 
architecture of the enforcement provisions still allows states to 
protect defendant interests in legal procedures and qualify remedies. 
 
 90.  See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 44-45 (requiring Member States to 
provide courts with the power to issue injunctions against infringers, and to make 
damages awards to compensate right holders). 
 91.  See Physicians Immunity Statute, 35 U.S.C. §287(c) (providing immunity 
from suit for patent infringement with respect to a medical practitioner’s 
performance of a medical activity). 
 92.  See, e.g., Krista Cox, Patents and Doctors and the USTR TPP Text, 
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (2011) (criticizing the TPP draft for failing to 
include an exception from patentability for surgical procedures, arguing that such 
failure creates an ethical dilemma for surgeons and is incompatible with U.S. law). 
 93.  Resolution of these arguments would depend both on the language of the 
various remedial provisions, plus a consideration of other TRIPS Articles, 
including in particular art. 41.1 of TRIPS, which requires that ‘enforcement 
procedures as specified under this Part are available under their law so as to permit 
effective action against any act of infringement. . .and remedies which constitute a 
deterrent to further infringements’ (emphasis added). See US-China Panel Report, 
supra note 75, at ¶¶ 8.1-8.5 (considering these provisions). Note that the Panel did 
not make findings on this and related arguments, as the focus of that dispute was 
what acts China was required to criminalize (not prosecute, or deter). It might also 
be possible to argue that absolute limits on remedies in relation to certain 
infringements ought to be considered ‘limitations’ on rights that must satisfy the 
relevant three step test. 
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As discussed below, they provide policy space for the operation of 
other safeguards. A state mindful of the need to promote public 
interests in copyright could direct the courts, when determining final 
remedies, to take into account factors such as the nature and extent of 
access that members of the public have to copyright content, or any 
public benefit arising from infringing use. It is also legitimate for 
courts (and other decision-makers) to exercise discretion in the 
course of IP enforcement proceedings. 
Even though the open-textured drafting of enforcement provisions 
may seem well-entrenched, not all international obligations are 
drafted in this way. There have been occasional encroachments into 
States’ and courts’ authority. For example, Article 13.1 of the EU IP 
Enforcement Directive provides that Member States “shall ensure 
that the competent judicial authorities, on application of the injured 
party, order the infringer” to pay damages.94 Similarly, an early U.S. 
proposal for the IP provisions of the TPP was framed in a way that 
may have mandated statutory damages on the election of the right 
holder. The leaked proposal, dated February 2011, included a 
requirement that “[i]n civil judicial proceedings, each Party shall, at 
least with respect to works, phonograms, and performances protected 
by copyright or related rights, and in cases of trademark 
counterfeiting, establish or maintain a system that provides for pre-
established damages, which shall be available upon the election of 
the right holder.”95 In one interpretation, only the plaintiff can decide 
whether statutory damages will be awarded, although the court will 
determine the amount awarded.96 This text was somewhat softened in 
the final TPP text.97 Additionally, text in the Australia-United States 
 
 94.  See EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 13.1. 
 95.  See The complete Feb 10, 2011 text of the U.S. proposal for the TPP IPR 
chapter, art. 12.4, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, March 10, 2011, 
http://keionline.org/node/1091. 
 96.  This assumes that statutory damages are framed as a range (as in the 
United States), so that even if a plaintiff elects statutory damages the amount 
remains to be determined. In the United States, a court might have oversight over, 
rather than determine, damages awards, which are determined by the jury. See 
TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.8 (noting that there may be limits to the State’s 
freedom to set statutory damages rates: the Article requires that pre-established 
damages must be set out “in an amount that would be sufficient to compensate the 
right holder for the harm caused by the infringement, and with a view to deterring 
future infringements”). 
 97.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.6-7 (giving a Party the option of 
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Free Trade Agreement (‘AUSFTA’) allowed Australia to eschew 
statutory damages in favor of its existing system of ‘additional 
damages,’ but with a qualifier: 
A Party may maintain a system of additional damages in civil judicial 
proceedings involving infringement of copyright in works, phonograms, 
and performances; provided that if such additional damages, while 
available, are not regularly awarded in proceedings involving deliberate 
acts of infringement where needed to deter infringement, that Party shall 
promptly ensure that such damages are regularly awarded or establish a 
system of pre-established damages as specified in sub-paragraph (a) with 
respect to copyright infringement.98 
It appears that at least some States would like to revisit the 
historical architecture of enforcement obligations in IP treaties, to 
ensure more frequent application of the available remedies. 
B. GENERAL GUARANTEE OF FAIRNESS AND EQUITY OR A FAIR 
TRIAL 
Another safeguard found in TRIPS and in most international IP 
instruments considered in this paper is a mandatory obligation that 
procedures concerning the enforcement of IP rights are fair and 
equitable.99 The language of fairness and equity is apt to address two 
fundamental principles100 commonly recognized in domestic systems 
 
providing for statutory damages or additional damages. The provision on 
additional damages retains the ‘traditional’ form of requiring that judicial 
authorities shall have the authority to award such additional damages as they 
consider appropriate (which could presumably be zero)); cf. TPP, supra note 25, 
art. 18.74.9 (requiring that statutory (pre-established) damages, if provided, must 
be available on the election of the right holder). 
 98.  See AUSFTA, supra note 36, art. 17.11.7(b). 
 99.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.2; ACTA, supra note 23; 2004 E.U. Directive, 
supra note 22; TPP, supra note 25 (providing provisions with differences in 
drafting and coverage. ACTA art. 6(2) is confined to the implementation of ACTA 
itself. TRIPS and the TPP require that any procedures aimed at IP enforcement be 
‘fair and equitable.’ The EU IP Enforcement Directive obliges Member States to 
‘provide for the measures, procedures and remedies necessary to ensure the 
enforcement of the intellectual property rights covered by this Directive’, and it is 
these procedures which must be fair and equitable: thus the obligation is not 
confined to the procedures laid out in the directive itself). 
 100.  See Spigelman, supra note 84 (discussing how not all jurisdictions 
recognize constitutional or statutory human rights as such; thus in Australia, which 
has neither a constitutional bill of rights nor (at a federal level) a statutory scheme 
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and international human rights instruments, namely (1) the right to a 
fair trial, and (2) rights to due process in the making of 
administrative or executive decisions that affect a person’s rights or 
interests.101 During the preparatory work on the TRIPS agreement, 
various terms were used in individual country proposals: ‘natural 
justice’ and ‘due process’ among them; however, the negotiators 
recognized that, at the time, these were not international law 
concepts, and that local judicial proceedings would vary 
considerably.102 The term ‘fair and equitable’ is an umbrella term apt 
across the full range of legal systems. 
The necessary features of fair trial or administrative processes 
cannot be exhaustively enumerated in the abstract: the essence of 
these principles lies in their application in the infinite variety of 
actual cases.103 Fairness in legal procedure is also an evolving 
concept. It was not so long ago that rights to legal representation or 
rights to be heard were not considered essential parts of a fair trial;104 
into the future, developing technology will require further 
evolution.105 Certain elements are, however, commonly recognized 
 
for the protection of human rights, it is arguably more appropriate to talk about the 
principle of a fair trial and due process, recognized in the common law). 
 101.  See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 32, art. 14 
(providing for equality before courts; reasonable grounds must be provided for any 
distinctions). 
 102.  During early negotiations, states put forward lists of procedural protections 
they considered necessary, under various rubrics from ‘due process’ to ‘natural 
justice and fair play.’ See U.S. proposal dated Oct 13, 1988 
(MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14/Rev.1) pp12ff; see also European Communities proposal 
dated May 30, 1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/31) pp4-5; Submission from Canada 
dated Sept. 5 1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/42); Communication from India dated 
Sept 5, 1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/40); Proposal by Japan dated 12 September 
1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/43); Communication from the Republic of Korea 
dated Oct. 26, 1989 (MTN.GNG/NG11/W/48); see also the Synoptic Table 
produced by the Secretariat on enforcement provisions dated June 7, 1989 
(collecting and synthesizing the early Japanese, EC and U.S. proposals). 
 103.  Spigelman, supra note 84; Galligan, supra note 1. 
 104.  See, e.g., J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 
417–18 (1971) (noting the considerable disadvantages suffered by defendants prior 
to the 19
th
 century and outlining gradual introduction of pro-defendant reforms in 
England, such as the right to representation (1836), the right to call witnesses 
(1867) and even the right to give their own sworn evidence (1898)). 
 105.  For example, expectations of documents being provided in electronic, 
rather than paper form so that electronic search and analysis tools can be used 
during trial preparation. More futuristically, to the extent that tools using artificial 
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attributes of fairness: including an independent and impartial court or 
tribunal; a public trial; notice of any charge, civil claim, or proposed 
action affecting rights; time and facilities to prepare; access to 
relevant evidence or information; rights to legal representation or 
counsel; and rights to be heard and offer evidence in response to the 
claim, charge, or proposed administrative action and any evidence 
which may be the basis of a decision affecting a person’s rights.106 
Some of these specific elements of fair trial and due process are 
reflected in the specific provisions in TRIPS in Articles 41 through 
43.107 Under Article 41 TRIPS, decisions on the merits (1) should 
preferably be in writing and reasoned; (2) must be based only on 
evidence on which the parties were offered the opportunity to be 
heard; and (3) must be made available at least to parties without 
undue delay.108 Judicial review must be available in respect of final 
administrative decisions, and appeals from trial court decisions are 
also required at least on points of law.109 Article 42, entitled ‘Fair and 
Equitable Procedures,’110 requires that defendants have the right to 
written notice of any claim, and timely and sufficiently detailed 
information inclusive of relevant facts, and the legal basis for the 
claim.111 It also requires that all parties have the right to 
independently selected legal representation for all activities and in all 
procedural stages, and prohibits onerous requirements for personal 
appearances for any party.112 Parties must have the right to present 
relevant evidence; and confidential information must be protected 
 
intelligence or data mining are developed to predict wrongdoing, process rights 
and remedial limits will also need to evolve. 
 106.  This incomplete list is drawn from Article 14 of the ICCPR (supra note 
70), as well as the recent discussions in a recent report of the Australian Law 
Reform Commission. See Australian L. Reform Comm’n, Traditional Rights and 
Freedoms – Encroachments by Commonwealth Laws, Report No. 129 (2016) 
(focusing on chapters 8 (Fair Trial) and 14 (Procedural Fairness)). 
 107.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 41-43. 
 108.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41. 
 109.  See Spigelman, supra note 84 (arguing that parties to a proceeding shall 
have the opportunity for judicial authority subject to jurisdictional provisions in 
national laws concerning the importance of a case). 
 110.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 42 (setting out the obligation to provide fair 
and equitable procedures for the enforcement of IP rights). 
 111.  See id. 
 112.  See id. 
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subject to any contrary constitutional requirements.113 Article 43 
TRIPS guarantees access to evidence in the hands of another party. 
Taken together, Articles 41–43 TRIPS protect many internationally 
recognized elements of the right to a fair trial and due process, and 
ensure that a defendant can effectively participate in proceedings.114 
As I have noted elsewhere,115 the specific elaborations in Articles 
41–43 TRIPS do not fully reflect commonly accepted elements of a 
fair trial.116 A procedure could be compliant with these specific rules 
yet unfair by the international standards established in Article 14 of 
the ICCPR.117 Article 14 states that fair trial in civil proceedings 
requires equality before courts and tribunals for all persons whose 
rights and obligations are to be determined.118 Equality before the 
law has been articulated as requiring even-handed treatment of 
parties: 
The machinery of justice, the process by which rights are enforced, must 
not . . . confer an advantage on one litigant at the expense of another 
 
 113.  Compare id. with Sascha Vander, Section 1: General Obligations, in 
TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 707 (Peter-Tobias 
Stroll, et al. eds., 2009) (explaining that mandating a prohibition against secrecy in 
civil procedures has a constitutional basis in some South American countries and 
in South East Asia). 
 114.  Summers, supra note 69, at 742; see Lawrence Solum, Procedural Justice, 
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004) (highlighting how effective participation is a 
fundamental element of procedural justice as conceived by modern scholars 
working on legal systems and procedure). 
 115.  Weatherall, Provocations and Challenges, supra note 16, at 192-93. 
 116.  Note also that the relevant principles are applied, not just to court trials, 
but to equivalent administrative processes: see e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 49, 
50.8, 62.4; see Daniel J. Gervais, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY 
AND ANALYSIS 461–62 (Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters 3rd ed. 2008) 
(showing how international IP instruments frequently include one or more 
provisions that allow parties to use administrative rather than judicial procedures in 
some or all circumstances, but which state that administrative proceedings must 
meet the same standards of fairness etc. as judicial proceedings); see also TPP, 
supra note 25, art. 18.31(a), 18.74.16 (including provisions of this kind; a number 
of TPP provisions also refer to ‘competent authorities’ which would include 
administrative, judicial or executive authorities but subject them to requirements of 
fairness or transparency). 
 117.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 118.  See ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 14 (stating also that all persons shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law, and in the determination of criminal charges everyone shall be 
awarded minimum guarantees). 
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litigant, who has a claim to equal respect. It must not favor defendants 
over plaintiffs, or vice versa, just as it must not favor the state over private 
litigants.119 
Article 14 also requires a hearing before a competent, 
independent, and impartial tribunal established by law.120 The better 
view is that these elements of a fair trial, although not explicitly 
stated in Article 42, are essential to providing procedures that meet 
the standard set by Article 41.2.121 A Panel considering the scope of 
fair and equitable procedures could be expected to take notice of the 
ICCPR’s conception of the requirements of a fair trial. 
In summary, the obligation to ensure that IP enforcement 
procedures are fair and equitable is an important safeguard for the 
rights of defendants and prospective defendants. It obliges Member 
States to provide, within the context of their own legal system and 
consistent with the importance of any case and the interests and 
amount of money or other rights at stake, procedures that accord 
even-handed treatment to parties to litigation. Additionally, it 
requires mechanisms for ascertaining rights before competent, 
independent, and impartial tribunals, as well as the basic factors of 
fair trial: notice, legal representation, opportunities to make a case, 
and answer evidence put by other parties. 
Thus conceptualized, Articles 41–43 of TRIPS (and equivalents in 
later instruments) provide a useful benchmark against which to judge 
IP enforcement reforms. In recent times, a number of countries have 
moved to allow for blocking of overseas websites:122 a right to 
 
 119.  A.A.S Zuckerman, Interlocutory Remedies in Quest of Procedural 
Fairness, 56 THE MODERN L. REV. 325, 325 (1993). 
 120.  See ICCPR, supra note 70 (setting out this requirement. Note that this idea 
is partially reflected in TRIPS art. 41.4 which requires review by a judicial 
authority of final administrative decisions; and even if a tribunal failed to meet the 
ICCPR standard, the judicial authority on appeal may comply). 
 121.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.2 (requiring that procedures must be “fair 
and equitable, and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail 
unreasonable time-limits or delays”). 
 122.  Court orders of this kind have become commonplace in the UK under § 
97A of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1998 (UK). See Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp v. British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981; Cartier 
International v. British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [2014] EWHC 3354. In Europe, see 
UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega 
Filmproducktionsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-314/12, March 27, 2014; in Australia, 
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written notice and timely and sufficiently-detailed information 
inclusive of relevant facts and the legal basis of any claim, ought to 
limit the temptation to wholly automate such processes and deny 
notice provided to targeted websites.123 Reforms that apply overly 
strong presumptions regarding subsistence, validity, or infringement 
of rights, or which place the burden of proof on the less resourced 
party, could be seen as undue favoritism towards one party, 
imperiling equality before courts and tribunals.124 The requirement of 
a ‘competent, independent, and impartial tribunal’ could be breached 
by some streamlined structures for online copyright enforcement, in 
particular those using private forms of arbitration.125 Much would 
 
see Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) § 115A (providing for blocking of websites engaged 
in flagrant infringement); see also Copyright Act 1987 (Singapore) s193DDA 
(allowing for website blocking of websites engaged in flagrant infringement). 
 123.  It should be noted that the TRIPS text in Articles 41–43 refers only to 
defendants. In an (overseas) website blocking case, the ‘defendant’ is ordinarily an 
internet service provider providing transmission services to customers: any 
targeted website is a third party to the action. It is worth noting therefore that the 
ICCPR (quoted immediately below) is more capacious in its language, and in fact 
the legislative systems in both Singapore and Australia do require rights holders to 
attempt to provide notice to affected websites. See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) § 
115A(4); Copyright Amendment Act 2014 (Singapore) 193DDB(1)(a). 
 124.  The impact of presumptions on equality of treatment depends significantly 
on the details of implementation: a presumption that can only be rebutted by clear 
and convincing evidence will have a far greater impact on a defendant than one 
which requires they raise a prima facie case. Another example of procedures that 
may increasingly be tilted towards right holders is provisions on seizure of 
allegedly infringing goods at the border. See Weatherall, Provocations and 
Challenges, supra note 11, at 192-93 (suggesting, that Australia, for example, has 
revised its criminal provisions in copyright and trademark broadened the available 
presumptions for proving subsistence and ownership of IP, tilting the balance 
against defendants. Australia has also advantaged copyright owners by revising its 
border measures to allow for the seizure and destruction of alleged infringing 
goods without any formal court process). 
 125.  See Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response American Style: “Six Strikes” 
Measured Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 4, 25, 54 (2013) 
[hereinafter Bridy, Graduated Response] (suggesting that corporate copyright 
owners have been trying to get ISPs to play a more active role in online copyright 
enforcement where the ISPs promptly remove the content when they become 
aware of it, and are situated to remove or disable access to it); see also Mary 
LaFrance, Graduate Response by Industry Compact: Piercing the Black Box, 30 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 165, 166 (2012); see generally Nicolas Suzor & Brian 
Fitzgerald, The Legitimacy of Graduate Response Schemes in Copyright Law, 36 
UNSW L.J. 1, 18 (2011) (highlighting how many copyright owners are enlisting 
the assistance of Internet Service Providers (ISP’s), via processes in which the ISP 
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depend on the particular rules and whether they preserve access to 
the courts.126 It is not hard to imagine circumstances in which 
policymakers might skirt the border between expertise and partiality 
by appointing experts to tribunals who have a real or perceived 
interest in the subject matter of enforcement. 
Important as it is, the obligation to provide fair and equitable IP 
enforcement procedures has not been included in all recent 
international IP instruments dealing with enforcement. In particular, 
it was not routinely included in the U.S. bilateral trade agreements 
concluded in the first decade and a half of the 21
st
 Century (like 
AUSFTA), nor was it part of the early U.S. proposals for the IP 
chapter of the TPP,127 although it was part of the final text.128 Further, 
the specific elaborations in TRIPS as to factors included in fair and 
equitable treatment are not repeated in the TPP (Art. 18.71.3), ACTA 
(Art. 6.2), or the EU IP Enforcement Directive (Art. 3.1).129 The legal 
 
takes action against users suspected of infringing copyright including issuing 
warnings, reporting copyright owners, suspension and eventual termination of 
service). 
 126.  Bridy, Graduated Response, supra note 125, at 18-19 (discussing a 
decision of the French Constitutional Court ruling that a user’s internet access 
could not be suspended solely on the authority of an administrative body without 
court order. This argument could instead be reframed as breaching the requirement 
for a competent, independent and impartial tribunal); see also Weatherall, 
Provocations and Challenges, supra note 11, at 8 (suggesting that a key potential 
limitation of the obligation to ensure fair and equitable enforcement procedures is 
that it likely does not apply to procedures which are entirely private – such as 
enforcement disciplines imposed by internet service providers as part of any 
service contract); see also Suzor, supra note 125, at 33 (arguing for fair trial and 
due process rights to private procedures). 
 127.  There is no such provision, for example, in the leaked U.S. proposal for the 
TPP IP chapter dated February 10, 2011. Trans-Pacific Partnership Intellectual 
Property Chapter Draft, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/tpp-10feb2011-us-text-ipr-chapter.pdf 
[hereinafter TPP Draft] (lacking a similar provision). 
 128.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71.3 (requiring procedures and remedies 
that shall be fair and equitable, shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or 
entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays). 
 129.  More recent instruments do not enumerate all of these elements of a fair 
and equitable system for enforcement. The TPP includes requirements for 
decisions and reasons to be given in writing (TPP, art. 18.73.1(a)), but neither the 
TPP nor ACTA makes any reference to the right to present or be heard on 
evidence. See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.73.1(a) (holding only that these 
procedures shall not be unnecessarily complicated, costly or entail unreasonable 
time limits or unwarranted delays). 
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impact of such changes is discussed further below: in short, as I 
argue below,130 omission of mandatory standards from TRIPS does 
not change Parties’ obligation under international law to provide 
these safeguards. Nevertheless, the absence of this rule and its 
‘slimming down’ is potentially disturbing, if it is taken to suggest 
that the specific protections in TRIPS are not important. 
C. OTHER GENERAL PRINCIPLES: PROPORTIONALITY AND 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Other general principles stated in the various IP instruments 
provide potential safeguards for defendant interests. One important 
limit on both procedures and remedies is the requirement that they be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the infringement. The threat of 
grossly disproportionate damages is likely to chill creative and 
inventive activity and other interactions with IP-protected material.131 
Unfortunately, proportionality is addressed inconsistently and the 
relevant treaty language is typically weak. 
Although in most respects TRIPS provides the ‘gold standard’ in 
defendant safeguards, the proportionality is one exception. The 
TRIPS text contains no general requirement of proportionality. 
However, it does include a number of specific references to the 
concept in the provisions on destruction of infringing copies and 
implements (Art. 46) and the right of information (Art. 47).132 In both 
cases, TRIPS does not mandate proportionate responses or orders. In 
relation to destruction of infringing copies, TRIPS requires that the 
‘need for proportionality between the seriousness of the infringement 
and the remedies ordered as well as the interests of third parties shall 
be taken into account.’133 In the case of the right of information, 
 
 130.  See discussion, infra Part IV.A. 
 131.  See Samuelson & Wheatland, Statutory Damages, supra note 35 
(discussing the impacts of disproportionate statutory damages awards). 
 132.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 46 (requiring that courts considering requests 
for orders for destruction of infringing goods, materials and implements consider 
the need for proportionality between the seriousness of the infringement and the 
remedies ordered as well as the interests of third parties shall be taken into 
account); see also TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47 (requiring that courts have the 
power to order infringers to reveal the identity of third persons involved in 
production and distribution of infringements, unless this would be disproportionate 
to the infringement). 
 133.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 46. 
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Article 47 states that: 
Members may provide that the judicial authorities shall have the 
authority, unless this would be out of proportion to the seriousness of the 
infringement, to order the infringer to inform the right holder of the 
identity of third persons involved in the production and distribution of the 
infringing goods or services and of their channels of distribution.134 
Although the drafting of this provision is not clear, it suggests that 
proportionality is something that courts should consider in deciding 
whether to require the production of information from an infringer.135 
The TPP, ACTA, and the EU IP Enforcement Directive all refer to 
proportionality, although the language varies significantly. The EU 
Directive is the most forceful: it requires that measures, procedures, 
and remedies shall be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive.’136 
This has been interpreted as requiring that measures adopted “do not 
exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to 
obtain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in 
question; where there is a choice between several appropriate 
measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous.”137 The nature 
 
 134.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47. 
 135.  The combination of an optional provision with a limitation based on 
proportionality could be interpreted another way: namely as allowing for a right of 
information but only in those cases where it would not be out of proportion to the 
seriousness of the infringement. This reading, however, seems to be inconsistent 
with subsequent developments in international IP instruments, which have 
expanded the right of information while retaining proportionality as a 
consideration, but not a limit, on the application of the procedure. EU Directive 
2001/29, supra note 60, at art. 3; Compare ACTA, supra note 23, art. 11 (setting 
out a right of information), with ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.3 (allowing for the 
consideration of proportionality, but not as a mandatory limit on the availability of 
procedures and remedies); see also TPP, supra note 25, arts. 18.74.13, 18.71.5 
(requiring a right of information and requiring consideration (but not achievement) 
of proportionality in granting remedies and penalties). The 2004 EU IP 
Enforcement Directive is different: as noted, that directive mandates that 
enforcement measures be ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ (EU Directive 
2004/48, supra note 22, Art. 3.1) and underlines this requirement of 
proportionality in the art. 8 right of information by stating that Member States must 
ensure that judicial authorities may order the production of information ‘in 
response to a justified and proportionate request of the claimant’: art. 8.1. 
 136.  EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60. 
 137.  See generally Cartier Int’l AG v. British Sky Broad. Ltd., [2014] EWHC 
(Ch) 3354 (Eng.) (discussing proportionality in the context of website blocking 
orders, relying on principles from EU case law outside the area of IP). 
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and importance of other rights (such as rights to freedom of 
expression) affected by a remedy and the cost and difficulty of 
complying with orders are all relevant in assessing proportionality.138 
In Europe, therefore, the requirement of proportionality provides a 
specific avenue for considering the importance of other rights 
(including human rights) affected by a given enforcement measure.139 
By comparison, ACTA and the TPP contain a lesser obligation 
that Parties implementing the provisions “take into account the need 
for proportionality.”140 This suggests that a disproportionate remedy 
or order could fail the standard set by the EU Directive but comply 
with that in the TPP if proportionality was considered but prioritized 
below other goals such as deterrence.141 It is also important to note 
that the obligation in ACTA and the TPP is an obligation for parties 
to the treaty to take proportionality into account in 
implementation.142 Unlike the TRIPS requirements or the EU text, 
 
 138.  See id. at ¶ 181 (holding that “limitations to rights may be made only if 
they are necessary and meet the objectives of general interest recognized by the 
Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others”); see also Golden 
Eye Int’l. v. Telefonica U.K. Ltd. [2012] EWHC 723 (ruling that courts shall take 
into account the applicable remedies, penalties, and interests of third parties). 
 139.  See EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60, Initial Provisions and General 
Definitions (asserting that the obligations created by the directive co-exist with 
their international agreements and existing rights and obligations). 
 140.  See ACTA, supra note 23 (affirming that when determining 
proportionality each party must consider the seriousness of the infringement, the 
interests of third parties, the applicable measures, remedies and penalties); See also 
Initial Provisions and General Definitions (providing various party-specific 
definitions qualifying key terms). 
 141.  Of course this is a moot point: no party bound by the EU Directive is or is 
likely to be a party to the TPP which is a mega-regional agreement covering only 
countries in the Asia-Pacific. On the other hand, the difference between the EU 
Directive and the text of the TPP may reflect a difference between the United 
States and EU which could be interesting to watch in the context of the TTIP 
negotiations. Compare TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71 (adopting only that each 
party shall take the need for proportionality into consideration and that these 
procedures shall be applied in a manner that avoids the creation of barriers to 
legitimate trade), with EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60, recital 22 (holding 
that it is “essential that provisional measures for the immediate termination of 
infringements without awaiting a decision on the substance of a case, while 
observing the rights of the defence, ensuring the proportionality of the provisional 
measures” be provided). 
 142.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71 (mandating that in implementing the 
provisions of the TPP each Party shall take into account the need for 
proportionality); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.3 (drafted in almost identical 
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individual courts in particular cases are not required to take 
proportionality into account.143 It is also noteworthy that the scope 
contemplated for a principle of proportionality varies from treaty to 
treaty. The ACTA applies this requirement to ‘measures, remedies 
and penalties.’144 By contrast the TPP only applies a requirement of 
proportionality to ‘applicable remedies and penalties.’145 Both ACTA 
and TPP require consideration of the need for proportionality 
between these measures or remedies, the seriousness of the 
infringement, and the interests of third parties.146 ACTA further 
articulates an additional general requirement that procedures 
‘provide for the rights of all participants subject to such procedures 
to be appropriately protected’ (without elaborating further on which 
‘rights’ might be relevant, although the ICCPR’s right to a fair trial is 
an obvious candidate, as are the various rights to notice, etc., set out 
in TRIPS Articles 41–43).147 
Even aside from the relative weakness of this language on 
proportionality contained in international IP instruments, 
proportionality has inherent limits as a constraint on enforcement 
procedures which have been well-explained by legal theorists. For 
example, recent work of legal philosopher Nicola Lacey148 points out 
that proportionality is not a naturally existing relationship between, 
say, a wrong and a punishment.149 Nor, according to empirical 
studies cited by Lacy, is there a general consensus about what 
 
language). 
 143.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 46, 47 (addressing, in each case, the 
requirement of proportionality to powers exercised by judicial authorities); see also 
EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60, art. 10.3 (requiring that courts consider the 
need for proportionality when considering a request for corrective measures). 
 144.  See ACTA, supra note 23, art. 1. 
 145.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71. 
 146.  TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71.5; see ACTA, supra note 23, art.  6.3. 
 147.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41 (establishing procedures that ensure 
enforcement will not be complicated or costly, written decisions, and an 
opportunity for judicial review). 
 148.  See Nicola Lacey & Hanna Pickard, The Chimera of Proportionality: 
Institutionalizing Limits on Punishment in Contemporary Social and Political 
Systems, 78 MOD. L. REV. 216 (2015); see also Nicola Lacey, The Metaphor of 
Proportionality, 43 J.L. SOC’Y 27, 38 (2016). 
149. See Lacey, supra note 162, at 38 (arguing that proportionality is a product of 
social and political considerations, cultural components and institution building). 
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constitutes a ‘proportionate’ punishment or remedy.150 While there 
may be a fair degree of consensus regarding the relative seriousness 
of ‘standard’ criminal offenses, there is far less consensus regarding 
what this implies in terms of what penalty is suitable. There may be 
no agreement on the relative seriousness of regulatory offenses, 
which would include IP offenses. Following the logic of the WTO 
Panel decision in the US-China dispute,151 what constitutes 
proportionate punishment is highly likely to be determined by 
reference to the broader legal system and societal context within a 
given country. It would be legitimate for significant differences in 
remedies and penalties to exist from country to country for all kinds 
of reasons. Indeed, this principle is commonly reflected in 
international IP text relating to criminal penalties, such as Article 61 
TRIPS, which requires that: 
Remedies available [for criminal IP offenses] shall include imprisonment 
and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with 
the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity.152 
Given Lacey’s work, it is far from clear how to interpret the last 
phrase of this provision; exactly what kinds of offenses would be of 
‘corresponding gravity?’153 Even acknowledging all these limitations, 
recognizing proportionality as a consideration is better than having 
no such consideration to counter the requirement that measures be 
‘deterrent.’154 Such a requirement at least provides space to consider 
 
 150.  See id., at 40 (suggesting a difference between ordinal proportionality in 
which there is a noteworthy degree of consensus and cardinal proportionality, 
which reveals no consensus regarding suitable penalties). 
 151.  See generally US-China Panel Report, supra note 75 at ¶ 7.514.. 
 152.  Accord TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.77.6(a). The EU IP Enforcement 
Directive does not address criminal enforcement; the EU did not, at the time the 
Directive was drafted, have jurisdiction to address matters of national criminal law; 
see ACTA, supra note 23, art. 24 (establishing that it is understood that there is no 
obligation for a party to provide for the possibility of imprisonment and monetary 
fines to be imposed in parallel); see also EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60, 
recital 28 (stating only that “criminal sanctions also constitute, in appropriate 
cases, a means of ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights”). 
 153.  It may be that, consistent with the reasoning in US–China, the 
determination of what kinds of offenses are of ‘corresponding gravity’ is a matter 
for a particular State to determine. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41. 
 154.  Modern IP treaties often put effectiveness and deterrence at the forefront 
of the enforcement calculus. Compare TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1, with ACTA, 
supra note 23, art. 6.1, and TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71.1, with EU Directive 
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whether a damage award in six figures awarded against an individual 
engaged in file-sharing, while undoubtedly a ‘deterrent,’ is 
appropriate.155 Where deterrence rules over proportionality, there is 
considerable risk of creating both scapegoats and significant chilling 
effects. 
TRIPS and other instruments also require that enforcement 
measures must be effective. The EU IP Enforcement Directive 
requires that “measures, procedures and remedies shall . . . be 
effective.”156 TRIPS, ACTA, and the TPP all oblige parties to: 
ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available 
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of 
infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this 
Agreement . . . .157 
This requirement has the capacity to limit the availability of 
measures because it may rule out measures, such as remedies, which 
would be futile. We are perhaps accustomed to thinking about 
‘effectiveness’ as requiring implementation of IP owner rights almost 
at all costs on the basis that a requirement to provide ‘effective’ 
enforcement measures means that the measures provided must work 
and reduce infringement. But decisions from the UK suggest that 
measures such as website blocking are less likely to be considered 
effective or proportionate if there are a large number of alternative 
websites that are equally accessible and appealing.158 
A final general safeguard is the protection of privacy and 
 
2001/29, supra note 60 (establishing similar but slightly different language; 
requiring that ‘measures, procedures and remedies shall. . .be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive’). This latter trifecta is particularly telling: where the 
obligation is that measures be effective, proportionate and dissuasive, the concept 
of proportionality stands out as the factor most likely to provide safeguards for 
defendant users. 
 155.  See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 899 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (suggesting damages equivalent to USD $222,000 for 24 songs made 
available on peer-to-peer networks). 
 156.  EU Directive 2001/29, supra note 60, art. 3.2. 
 157.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1; ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.1; TPP, supra 
note 25, art. 18.71.1. 
 158.  See Cartier Int’l AG, EWHC (Ch) 3354, ¶¶ 175-176 (holding that UK 
courts have the power to grant injunctions against an ISP if it has “actual 
knowledge” that an operator was using its service to infringe copyright, but noting 
also the relevance of how readily available other means of infringement are). 
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confidentiality. Privacy and confidentiality are particularly important 
in the context of enforcement procedures for securing evidence 
(which may involve the seizure or provision of private, or 
commercially sensitive, information). They are also important to the 
‘right of information’ – that is, the power granted in a number of 
international IP instruments for courts to order (or authorities to 
provide) information in the hands of an infringer, alleged infringer, 
or third party that may identify other infringers of IP for the purposes 
of bringing proceedings.159 TRIPS makes a number of references to 
confidentiality.160 Article 42 requires that IP enforcement procedures 
‘provide a means to identify and protect confidential information’;161 
and Article 43, which relates to the production of reasonably 
available evidence, is subject to ‘conditions which ensure the 
protection of confidential information.’162 The protection of 
confidential information is also referenced in Article 57, which 
provides for inspection of goods detained at the border.163 ACTA and 
the TPP also both make numerous references to confidentiality.164 
However, it is important to note that most of these provisions allow 
for the application of a State’s laws regarding privacy or 
confidentiality, rather than imposing an independent international 
obligation to protect confidentiality or privacy.165 Such provisions, 
 
 159.  See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47 (detailing the right of information). 
 160.  See generally id. art. 42-43, 57 (including confidentiality references under 
the fair and equitable procedures, evidence, and right of inspection and information 
articles). 
 161.  Id. art. 42 (indicating the procedures are to be followed unless this would 
be contrary to existing constitutional requirements). 
 162.  Id. art. 43 (indicating that judicial authorities have the authority to order 
the evidence be subject to such conditions of confidentiality). 
 163.  See id. art. 57 (providing for border seizure of alleged infringing items in 
certain circumstances). 
 164.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18 (referencing Article 18.74.13 on the 
qualification on the right of information, Article 18.74.14 on the power to sanction 
parties, counsel and experts for breach of rules concerning protection of 
confidential information, and Article 18.76.4 on the qualification on provisions of 
information about goods suspended at the border); see also ACTA, supra note 23, 
art. 4, 11, 22 (referencing in Article 4 the general qualifications of privacy and 
disclosure of information, and in Article 11 the qualification on the right of 
information related to infringement, and in Article 22 the disclosure of information 
related to shipments of goods). 
 165.  See ACTA, supra note 23, art. 4 (making the various obligations in ACTA 
subject to considerations of privacy and confidentiality, but qualifying those 
considerations by reference to domestic legal principles). 
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therefore, empower States to act to secure privacy interests and 
confidential information if they so choose, or, for States recognizing 
a constitutional right to privacy, ensure consistency between their 
Constitution and international IP obligations. 
D. OTHER SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS FOR DEFENDANTS 
This Part has so far focused on potential sources of safeguards for 
defendant rights and interests that are framed at the level of general 
principle. These are important sources of protection for defendants, 
in part because principles are dynamic and have the capacity to 
adjust with and respond to changes in technology or the strategies of 
IP owners. However, it is important to be aware of very specific rules 
that are contained especially in TRIPS, and which oblige states to 
protect, or provide the capacity to protect, specific defendant 
interests during IP enforcement proceedings. 
A number of provisions provide for rights of review:166 a right to 
review final administrative decisions (Art. 41.4); a right to review of 
any suspension of (alleged infringing) goods by customs even if 
proceedings on the merits are commenced (in order to determine 
whether the suspension should be modified, revoked or confirmed) 
(Art. 55); and rights to the review of any provisional measures 
adopted inaudita altera parte (Art. 50.4).167 Other TRIPS provisions 
require expiry of provisional measures in the absence of an action on 
the merits: border measures expire if no proceedings are commenced 
within ten working days (extendable once) (Art. 55); TRIPS also 
requires that provisional measures be revoked on request if 
proceedings are not commenced within twenty working days (Art. 
50.6).168 
Finally, a number of provisions provide for compensation for a 
 
 166. Unsurprisingly, rights of review are not confined to protecting defendants: 
TRIPS contains a number of rights of review for the benefit of IP owners and 
applicants: See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31(g), 32, 62.5 (suggesting that the 
competent authorities such as judicial officers have the right of review. This power 
is not confined to protecting defendants as it is for the benefit of IP owners and 
applicants). 
 167.  See id. art. 41.4, 50.4, 55; see generally EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 
22, art. 7.1, 9.4 (similarly providing for rights to review such as orders for 
preservation of evidence and provisional and precautionary measures). 
 168.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50.6, 55. 
 (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2016  4:27 PM 
2016] SAFEGUARDS FOR DEFENDANT RIGHTS 251 
defendant for costs or harms incurred as a result of enforcement 
action. TRIPS requires that if provisional or border measures lapse or 
are revoked, or if no infringement or threat of infringement is found, 
courts will have the authority to order appropriate compensation for 
any injury suffered.169 The EU IP Enforcement Directive (Art. 7.4) 
and ACTA (Art. 12.5) both include a similar provision.170 Relatedly, 
TRIPS Articles 50 (provisional measures) and 53 (border measures) 
both require that when applying these procedures, competent 
authorities must have the power to order the applicant to provide a 
security or equivalent assurance sufficient to protect the defendant 
and to prevent abuse.171 
The importance of these specific safeguards lies in what they 
contribute to the protection of defendant rights and interests through 
their precision and clarity. While the principles discussed earlier in 
this paper are important for their ability to evolve and address new 
situations, these protections are clear and easy to implement. This is 
why it is once again disturbing to see how many have disappeared 
from certain recent international instruments dealing with IP 
enforcement: although the legal effect of their non-inclusion may be 
limited (as discussed further below), there is an element of ‘out of 
 
 169.  See TRIPS supra note 6, art. 50.7 (providing for compensation in relation 
to provisional measures); TRIPS supra note 6, art. 56  (providing for the 
indemnification of the importer and of the owner of the goods wrongly seized at 
the border). 
 170.  Regulation No. 608/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 June 2013 concerning customs enforcement of intellectual property rights and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1383/2003, O.J. (L. 181) 15, 15 
[hereinafter EU Regulation]. Within the EU, IP border measures are dealt with via 
a separate regulation which provides for compensation for harm in Article 28; see 
ACTA, supra note 23, art. 12.5 (providing for provisional measures and although 
ACTA contains no specific obligation regarding compensation, Article 18 does 
allow the competent authorities to require security sufficient to ‘protect the 
defendant’); see also EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 7.4 (setting out 
measures to preserve evidence and compensation); see generally TPP, supra note 
25, art. 18.74.15 (failing to provide for compensation akin to that available in the 
EU, but providing for judicial authorities to have authority to order compensation 
where a party requesting measures has abused enforcement procedures). 
 171.  Daniel Gervais, supra note 116, at 470 (describing that a security or such 
an assurance may be in the form of a credit or bank reference or local guarantor); 
see TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 50, 53; see also TPP, supra note 25, arts. 18.75.2, 
18.76.3 (setting out provisional measures and special requirements relating to 
border measures). 
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sight, out of mind,’ and it is important that these rules not be ignored 
when reforming IP enforcement procedures. It is arguable that some 
attempts to make enforcement measures more ‘efficient’ and 
‘effective,’ such as moves to allow for automated forfeiture of goods 
seized by customs, contravene the spirit if not the text of the TRIPS 
rules on border measures.172 
E. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE OF IP RIGHTS 
A final source of power for states to limit IP enforcement 
procedures and remedies lies in a set of Articles addressing abuse of 
rights, found in both general and specific forms in various 
international IP instruments.173 The most complete set of provisions 
is found in TRIPS, which incorporates three general provisions 
relating to the prevention of abuse IP rights (Art. 8), of market power 
(Art. 8.2 & 40), and of enforcement procedures (chiefly Art. 41).174 
 
 172.  See Weatherall, Provocations and Challenges, supra note 11, at 195-96; 
see also Thomas Jaeger et al., Statement of the Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on the Review of EU Legislation 
on Customs Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE 
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION & TAX LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 
10-08 (2010) (elaborating on international enforcement measures of intellectual 
property rights). ‘Automated forfeiture’ approaches are used in both the EU 
(Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 June 2013 concerning customs enforcement of Intellectual property rights and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003, OJ L 181/15 (29.6.2013) and in 
Australia. An importer whose goods are seized is required actively to object to 
seizure and claim the goods, or they are deemed to have consented to forfeiture. 
This is very different from the TRIPS model, which assumes that right holders 
must act within a given period to commence proceedings on the merits. 
 173.  See Gervais, supra note 116, at 2.404 (discussing the TRIPS agreement 
provisions on abuse); see also TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.3.2 (including language 
very similar to that in TRIPS, recognizing that appropriate measures “may be 
needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders”); see 
generally ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6.1 (Requiring that IP enforcement 
procedures be applied ‘in such a manner as to . . . provide for safeguards against 
their abuse’). Notably it is not unusual for the US bilateral FTAs to eschew general 
safeguards against abuse of IP rights, which raises some interesting questions of 
interpretation. 
 174.  TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 8, 40, 41. These are not the only provisions that 
mention abuse: less relevant to individual enforcement proceedings are art. 63 
(transparency), which requires the publication of laws, regulations, court decisions 
and administrative rulings pertaining to (inter alia) the prevention of the abuse of 
IP rights; and art. 67 (technical cooperation), which requires that developed 
countries provide developing and least-developed countries with assistance in the 
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Consideration of Article 40 (abuse of market power) raises 
competition law/antitrust issues and is beyond the scope of this 
paper,175 but abuse of rights, and abuse of process, both warrant more 
detailed discussion because both can be the basis for potential 
safeguards for defendants and broader public interests in IP 
enforcement cases. 
1. Preventing abuse of IP rights 
TRIPS Art. 8.2 recognizes that: 
Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of 
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of 
technology.176 
Article 8 does not create an obligation to take action to prevent the 
abuse of IP rights, but it does empower States to take action and 
provides a basis for interpreting other TRIPS provisions, including 
the (flexibly drafted) enforcement provisions.177 Similar to the 
concept of a fair trial, ‘abuse’ of IP rights is a dynamic concept 
 
preparation of laws and regulations dealing with (inter alia) the prevention of the 
abuse of IP rights. 
 175.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 40 (elaborating on the control of anti-
competitive practices in contractual licenses). 
 176.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 8.2; see also TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.3.2 
(setting forth identical text as in the TRIPS agreement). 
 177.  CARLOS MARIA CORREA, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 108–12 (2007) 
(noting that Article 8.2 is also important for the discussion of transfer of 
technology in the context of the TRIPS Agreement); Gervais, supra note 116, at 
2.85 (suggesting that the limitation “consistent with the provisions of this 
agreement” in this article is likely to confine the article to an “interpretive 
function” rather than a direct obligation); see TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 8 
(discussing general principles for adopting appropriate measures); see generally 
Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, 
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights—The 
Relationship Between the Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and Access to 
Medicines, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/280 (June 22, 2001) [hereinafter Communication 
from the European Communities and their Member States] (noting that “although 
Articles 7 and 8 were not drafted as general exception clauses, they are important 
for interpreting other provisions of the Agreement, including where measures are 
taken by Members to meet health objectives”). 
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capable of evolving to meet the creative antics of IP owners; 
therefore, it is neither necessary nor possible to provide an 
exhaustive definition. However, we can explore the potential of this 
concept. The question of interest is whether the general principle 
which allows State action against abuse of rights allows for some 
limits on IP enforcement procedures or remedies which may, by 
protecting the rights or interests of a defendant, promote broader 
public interests (and user rights) in IP. Abuse of rights may not 
immediately spring to mind as providing a means of safeguarding 
defendant and broader public interests. In fact, however, there is a 
long international and national history of limiting a plaintiff’s access 
to remedies for abuse of rights. 
At the national level, the longstanding Roman and civilian law 
concept of abuse of right (abus de droit)178 can operate as a defense 
to an action or a basis for refusing at least some remedies in an IP 
action. Abuse of right as applied in different jurisdictions varies 
significantly, and a detailed consideration is beyond the scope of this 
paper.179 Broadly, abuse of right refers to situations in which a right 
 
 178.  E.g. Christophe Geiger, THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, OR HOW ETHICS CAN INFLUENCE THE SHAPE AND USE OF IP 
LAW IN METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 171–74 
(Graeme Dinwoodie ed. 2013) (discussing the potential of abuse of right or 
analogous doctrines in domestic proceedings); see Mark Lemley, Beyond 
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 
151-58 (1999) (elaborating on the potential of copyright misuse in domestic 
proceedings); see also Alison Slade, Good Faith and the TRIPS Agreement: 
Putting Flesh on the bones of TRIPS “Objectives”, 63 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 353 
(2014) (discussing abuse of right as it is relevant to assessing state decisions 
regarding implementation of TRIPS and considering whether a State could abuse 
its rights in relation to treatment of IP). With the exception of Slade, these 
discussions are targeted at the level of domestic law: that is, they discuss the 
potential of abuse of right or analogous doctrines in domestic proceedings. Slade 
discusses abuse of right as it is relevant to assessing State decisions regarding 
implementation of TRIPS: that is, she considers whether a State could abuse its 
rights in relation to treatment of IP. The present discussion departs from this 
literature, in that it is concerned with ways that a State might justify certain 
implementations or adjustments to IP rights or, in particular, remedies within the 
text of TRIPS, in order to address alleged abuse of right by right holders. 
 179.  See Annekatrien Lenaerts, The General Principle of the Prohibition of 
Abuse of Rights: A Critical Position on Its Role in a Codified European Contract 
Law, 18 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 1121, 1122 (2010) (explaining abuse of right analysis 
within the European contract law system); see generally Michael Byers, Abuse of 
Rights: An Old Principle, A New Age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389, 391 (2002) (examining 
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is formally exercised in conformity with the conditions laid down in 
the rule granting the right, but where the legal outcome is against the 
objective of that rule. In other words, there is a ‘tension between the 
strict application of a rule and the true spirit of that rule.’180 U.S. law 
also recognizes the doctrine of copyright misuse, which is said to 
arise where a copyright owner seeks to leverage their limited 
monopoly to allow them to control areas outside the monopoly.181 
Such use is inconsistent with the purpose and ‘spirit’ of copyright. A 
finding of copyright misuse in the United States renders the 
copyright unenforceable but not void.182 U.S. courts have also 
recognized a doctrine of patent misuse, which is applied mostly 
where patents are used to violate antitrust law183 and similarly 
renders a patent unenforceable.184 
At the international level, one kind of right holder conduct, which 
has historically been viewed as an abuse of IP rights by a sizeable 
proportion of countries, is failure to work a granted patent, 
sometimes referred to as non-working of the patent. A patent is 
‘worked’ when it is exploited, although it can be exploited in two 
different ways. The absence of working at all, i.e. the failure to 
exploit the patent through either local manufacture of the invention 
or importation of products embodying the invention, is perhaps the 
obvious case where a patent might be ‘abused’. In such a case, use of 
the right to exclude is in tension with the overall objectives of IP, 
 
the origins, historical applications, and contemporary limitations of abuse of rights 
and demonstrating how the principle remains relevant). 
 180.  Lenaerts, supra note 179, at 1122; see Pierre Catala & John Antony Weir, 
Delict and Torts: A Study in Parallel, Part II, 38 TUL. L. REV. 221, 237–38 (1964) 
(noting that in cases where rights are framed in relatively general and generous 
terms commentators declare that it is particularly appropriate and may be 
particularly necessary). 
 181.  See Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 972-79 (4th Cir. 
1990) (holding that the misuse of copyright defense is a valid defense); see also 
Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1087 (2006) (analyzing 
United States courts and copyright misuse); see generally Alcatel USA, Inc. v. 
DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 792-94 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing the copyright 
misuse defense). 
 182.  Lemley, supra note 178, at 151. 
 183.  See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 386 (1945); see 
also Lemley, supra note 178, at 152-53 (discussing the difference between 
copyright and patent misuse such that patent misuse is largely co-extensive with 
antitrust analysis and copyright misuse is not). 
 184.  Hartford-Empire Co., at 386. 
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which include access to technology.185 But a failure to work locally 
(local non-working) – ie where the patent holder has exploited their 
exclusivity only through importation of the patented goods, and not 
through local manufacture – has also been conceived of as an abuse 
of right. For many developing countries, part of the quid pro quo of 
the patent system is that the grant of rights facilitates disclosure and 
encourages diffusion of technical information in a way that supports 
innovation including local innovation.186 This aspect of the quid pro 
quo of IP is reflected in TRIPS, specifically in Article 7’s references 
to transfer and dissemination of technology.187 Arguably, it is 
impossible for a developing country to ‘upskill’ the local population 
and, hence, create the foundation for future local innovation, without 
local practicing (through manufacture) of patented technology.188 
Non-working as described in the previous paragraph is specifically 
recognized as a potential abuse of patent rights and a legitimate basis 
for carefully circumscribed State action in Article 5(a) of the Paris 
Convention.189 During the TRIPS negotiations, developing nations 
proposed wording suggesting that rights holders owed positive 
 
 185. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 7 (elaborating on the objectives of the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights). 
 186. See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 66 (requiring developed country members to 
“provide incentives . . . or the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology 
transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a 
sound and viable technological base”). 
 187.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 7 (declaring that one of the objectives of the 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology). 
 188.  See GRAEME DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST 
VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 43–44 (2012); see generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE, ¶ 
5.46 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing the importance of local working for technology 
transfer). This argument would be stronger when mounted by countries needing to 
increase local scientific and innovative capacity: countries with advanced local 
research and innovation scenes and infrastructure does not have equivalent need to 
ensure local working in order to promote local innovative capacity. 
 189.  Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 5(a); see Dinwoodie, supra note 188, 
at 43-45 (illustrating an example between the United States and Brazil to enforce 
local working requirements); see generally Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent 
Rights and Local Working under the WTO TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the 
U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 375 (2002) (exploring the 
non-working phenomenon in the United States and Brazil patent dispute). 
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obligations to the State granting an IP right, such as actually utilizing 
granted patents. This language was ultimately not adopted in 
TRIPS,190 raising a question whether the Paris Convention’s 
conceptualization of non-working as abuse will survive.191 This was 
almost put to the test in the early days of TRIPS when the United 
States commenced dispute settlement procedures after Brazil 
awarded a compulsory license to a local manufacturer in order to 
ensure an adequate, affordable, reliable, and local supply of AIDS 
drugs. Brazil was relying on Article 31 and the provision in Article 8 
allowing members to take measures to protect public health.192 The 
parties reached a mutually agreeable solution which left the question 
of the legality of non-working requirements open.193 However, 
scholars have mounted a convincing argument based on a range of 
TRIPS articles that local working requirements are consistent with 
TRIPS.194 This suggests that States could enact a TRIPS-compliant 
system allowing defendants in infringement actions to counterclaim 
demanding some form of compulsory license in appropriate 
 
 190.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 2.1 (noting that TRIPS Article 2.1 requires 
that Members of TRIPS “comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the 
Paris Convention”); see generally Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty 
Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the 
Legality of Local Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275, 325 (2010) 
(elaborating on how the pharmaceutical industry lobbied for, but did not obtain, a 
prohibition on local working requirements). 
 191.  See Mercurio, supra note 190, at 286 (stating that a key question was 
whether local working requirements violate TRIPS Article 27, which requires that 
“patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to 
the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported 
or locally produced”). 
 192.  See Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil—Measures 
Affecting Patent Protection, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1 
(July 19, 2001) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by the United States] 
(setting out the request by the United States to consult with Brazil over local 
working requirements). 
 193.  See Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil–Measures 
Affecting Patent Protection, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/4, G/L/454, IP/D/23/Add.1 
(July 19, 2001) [hereinafter Notification of a Mutually Agreed Solution] (relaying 
the communications between Brazil and the United States that an agreed solution 
has been reached in the patent dispute over local working requirements). 
 194.  See Dinwoodie, supra note 188, at 43-45 (arguing that the language 
suggests that countries can require local working); see also Mercurio, supra note 
190, at 275-76 (arguing that working requirements are consistent with the TRIPS 
agreement). 
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circumstances of non-working.195 
What about decisions not to supply or to delay supply of copyright 
content as opposed to patented inventions? It is much harder to argue 
that a failure to supply copyright content is an abuse of IP rights. 
First, because unlike in the case of non-working for a patent, there is 
no treaty text recognizing ‘non-working’ of copyright as an abuse.196 
Second, because a societal quid pro quo is less central to copyright 
law: natural rights-based reasoning, which emphasizes the right of 
authors to control their authored works, and downgrades the 
theoretical role of the public interest in access to content and societal 
benefit, is stronger in copyright than in patent. Further, where the 
interaction between patent law and development is clear and 
reflected in Article 7 TRIPS, copyright’s development role is less 
clearly articulated in most international instruments. However, there 
is domestic precedent in the form of the U.S. copyright misuse 
doctrine; some international law scholars mention high royalties as a 
potential abuse of IP rights.197 Further, Article 8 is concerned 
generally with practices which ‘unreasonably restrain trade or 
adversely affect the international transfer of technology,’ which 
could be an effect of denying access to copyrighted content.198 
Internationally there is also some history of developing countries 
arguing that copyright, like patent, involves a quid pro quo so that a 
State ought to be entitled to take action if effective access is denied, 
especially in the context of developing countries’ demand for 
mechanisms to allow translations of copyright content, as well as 
access for the purposes of educating their populations.199 
 
 195.  Dinwoodie, supra note 188, at 43-45. 
 196.  See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, U.S. Manufacturing Clause, 
Basic Instruments and Selected Documents at 74 (31st Supp. 1985) [hereinafter 
GATT] (holding that the US’ extension of the local manufacturing clause violated 
the US’ obligations under the GATT, despite a long (US) history of requiring local 
manufacturing (printing) as a precondition of full copyright protection. Requiring 
local printing however is quite different to requiring local supply of copyright 
content). 
 197.  See Correa, supra note 177, at 105 (indicating that the regulation of royalty 
rates is one measure that can be taken to promote the public interest). 
 198.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 8. 
 199.  SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND Vol. II, Ch. 14 
(2006) (outlining the Berne Appendix, which allows developing nations certain 
narrow (and cumbersome) flexibilities over translation and reproduction of printed 
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Further, recent international instruments also suggest an emerging 
view that copyright, too, has a role in promoting development, and 
that a legitimate objective of copyright is access to created works. 
The best multilateral demonstration of this growing consensus is 
found in the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published 
Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise 
Print Disabled, which explicitly recognizes in its Preamble ‘the need 
to maintain a balance between the effective protection of the rights of 
authors and the larger public interest, particularly education, 
research, and access to information, and that such balance must 
facilitate effective and timely access to works for the benefit of 
persons with visual impairments or with other print disabilities.’200 
TPP Article 18.4 (‘Understandings in Respect of this Chapter’) also 
recognizes the need to facilitate the diffusion of information, 
knowledge, technology, culture and the arts through IP systems, and 
to take into account ‘the interests of relevant stakeholders, including 
right holders, service providers, users and the public’ (emphasis 
added).201 Taken together, these various points may justify a State’s 
view that at least some copyright owner’s decisions that have the 
effect of denying access to copyright material constitute an abuse of 
rights justifying mitigating measures by the State. 
What about situations where access to copyright content is delayed 
 
works); see Lionel Bently, Copyright, Translations, and Relations between Britain 
and India in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries 82(3) CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1181, 1182 (2007) (examining the historical background of the copyright 
relations between Britain and India in terms of the 1914 Act, in particular around 
rights of translation, as an example of an early attempt to accommodate a claim to 
local difference in a regime of both international and imperial standards. India’s 
conduct in positively allowing translations is an example of the longstanding 
demand for translation rights by certain developing countries). 
 200.  Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The (Non) Use of Treaty Object and Purpose 
in Intellectual Property Disputes in the WTO, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law Research Paper No. 11-15, in SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES IN THE DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 1992-2012 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2012). 
 201.  TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.4; see generally Kimberlee Weatherall, Section 
by Section Commentary on the TPP Final IP Chapter Published 5 November 
2015—Part 1—General Provisions, Trade mark, GIs, Designs (2015), 
http://works.bepress.com/kimweatherall/31/ (elaborating on the TPP final IP 
chapter and discussing that this is one area where it is arguable that some of the 
language of the TPP is more progressive and modern than TRIPS). 
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or unreasonably priced?202 In recent times, Australia has had an 
active debate over the delays its residents experienced in gaining 
access to movies and television shows.203 However, States are not 
entitled to sit in judgment over every pricing or marketing decision 
of copyright owners, even where inconvenient.204 Price and access 
decisions are of the essence of copyright as conceived as an 
exclusive right: at its heart, copyright depends on facilitating markets 
for copyrighted works. IP owners argue strongly that they are 
entitled to make decisions about price, and the date they will enter a 
market, with the overall purpose of maximizing profits. It would be 
inappropriate to describe situations where copyright content is 
delayed in the short term as ‘abuse’: a creator planning to exploit 
their material ought, in general, to be the first one to release material 
publicly and gain the benefits of well-timed, well-promoted first 
release. Further, not every price differential between countries is 
unjustified: it is not illegitimate that copyright content is more 
expensive in Australia, with its high annual average income, as 
compared to Vietnam; costs of marketing copyright content may well 
vary from country to country.205 
The concept of abuse of right is aimed at conduct that injuriously 
 
 202.  See generally Paris Convention, supra note 19, art. 5(a) (noting that as the 
discussion shades from denial of access to IP-protected products into denial of 
reasonable or timely access to IP-protected products, it is worth remembering that 
Article 5A of the Paris Convention refers to the abuses which might result from the 
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to 
work: thus clearly contemplating the concept of abuse extends to situations beyond 
non-working). 
 203.  See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure and 
Communications, Parliament of Australia, At What Cost? IT Pricing and the 
Australia Tax 92 (2013) (Austl.) [hereinafter Australia Tax] (examining alleged 
price and access differences suffered by Australians in gaining access to content, 
when compared against populations in other countries at similar levels of 
development). 
 204.  See Weatherall, supra note 201, at 1 (elaborating that there are many 
shades of grey at the level of copyright principle elsewhere). 
 205.  See Australia Tax, supra note 203, at vii (noting that the Australian 
Parliamentary Committee found that copyright owners did not, and likely could 
not, justify at least some of the price premiums which the Committee labelled “the 
Australia tax”); see generally JOE KARAGANIS, RETHINKING PIRACY IN MEDIA 
PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES, 56-63 (2011) (suggesting some methods that 
could be used to determine whether pricing is reasonable as well as evidence that 
in some cases in developing countries pricing is entirely unreasonable). 
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affects the interests of the community, or where the exercise of the 
right is inconsistent with the objectives of that right. It is appropriate 
to egregious, not everyday cases. A delay in seeing the latest 
Hollywood or HBO blockbuster is a #firstworldproblem. But 
evidence before an Australian Parliamentary Committee suggested 
there are more serious problems that can arise even for a developed 
country in relation to access to copyright material.206 The Committee 
found, for example, that business-essential software was priced 
significantly (and unjustifiably) higher in Australia than in the 
United States, creating an impediment to Australian small and 
medium enterprises’ ability to compete on a level playing field – an 
issue that could be seen as a quintessential trade issue.207 By analogy, 
if a country finds that copyright content, essential to the development 
of local capacity (for example, scientific journals or basic texts), was 
priced out of reach of, say, 90% of its population, then perhaps this 
might justify a conclusion that rights were being abused. 
Even a strong argument that certain practices constitute abuse does 
not, under TRIPS (or the TPP), give rise to a right in the State to take 
action contrary to other provisions of the agreement; recall that 
TRIPS Articles 8 and 18.3.2 are interpretive principles.208 However, 
the open-ended drafting of the enforcement provisions provides 
avenues for acting on abuse.209 That is, understanding certain 
practices of IP owners as abuse may assist a state to conceptualize 
 
 206.  See generally Australia Tax, supra note 203. 
 207.  See id. 24-26 (outlining cost differentials for professional software), 26-27 
(similar evidence regarding other specialist software). 
 208.  See Gervais, supra note 116, at 2.404. 
 209.  See Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss supra note 188, 72-78 (discussing the US 
Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). In 
eBay, the Supreme Court discussed the principles on which an injunction against 
patent infringement might be withheld, putting a greater burden on patent holders 
to establish irreparable injury and allowing for consideration whether the grant of 
an injunction would disserve the public interest: ibid at 391. Dinwoodie & 
Dreyfuss consider whether eBay is consistent with article 44 of TRIPS, and in 
defending it, fall back on some quite general arguments about state discretion in 
TRIPS’ enforcement provisions, and the difficulties for any challenger posed by 
the burden of proof established in the WTO in  US-China Panel Report, supra note 
75). Although noting that one possible defence for the eBay decision is that it 
creates a compulsory licence to correct an abuse of IP rights, they do not appear to 
consider whether characterising IP owner activity as ‘abuse’ could be used to 
support an approach to implementing article 44 of TRIPS, as contemplated here. 
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and defend principles designed to tailor remedies for IP infringement 
in a way that is sensitive to the overall objectives of IP rights. For 
example, a State might legislate to require courts to consider the 
absence or degree of public access to copyright content in 
determining remedies. The Copyright Principles Project led by 
intellectual property professor Pamela Samuelson  suggested that 
availability should be relevant to court decisions to grant or refuse 
injunctions,210 but such factors could also be relevant to the award of 
damages.211 Recent IP instruments often require that courts assessing 
damages for IP infringement have the authority to consider ‘any 
legitimate measure of value the right holder submits, which may 
include lost profits, the value of the infringed goods or services 
measured by the market price, or the suggested retail price.’212 There 
is nothing, however, in the text concerning damages that prevents a 
State from adding other relevant considerations, such as accessibility 
of IP-protected content, in terms both of whether it is available at all, 
and whether it is affordable. Similar considerations could also be 
relevant to prosecutors’ decisions whether to commence criminal 
proceedings: public authorities might wish to prioritize the spending 
of public enforcement resources on copyright material made widely 
available to the public, or even refuse to spend public resources 
where materials are not available, or negotiate for better public 
access as a precondition of devoting public resources to 
enforcement.213 
 
 210. See Pamela Samuelson et al, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions 
for Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1223–26 (2010) (recommending that 
courts should have discretion to issue injunctions in copyright infringement cases. 
The Copyright Principles project was designed to bring together experts with a 
range of views and perspectives to consider whether ‘common ground’ on certain 
amendments to copyright law could be reached). 
 211.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 45.1 (setting out the power judicial authorities 
have in awarding damages); ACTA, supra note 23, art. 9.1 (establishing principles 
for damages and the enforcement through civil judicial proceedings); EU Directive 
2004/48, supra note 22, art. 13 (establishing principles relating to damages and the 
power judicial authorities have to order them); see, e.g., TPP, supra note 25, arts. 
18.74.3-18.74.4 (bearing considerable resemblance to the provisions referenced 
here). 
 212.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.74.4 (setting out measures of damages 
judicial authorities may utilize); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 9.1 (bearing 
considerable resemblance to the provisions referenced here). 
 213.  See Kimberlee Weatherall, A Reimagined Approach to Enforcement from a 
Regulator’s Perspective in What if we could reimagine copyright? (Rebecca Giblin 
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Similar to other safeguards discussed in this paper, principles 
regarding States’ rights to take action against abuse of rights have 
been under pressure and are at some risk of disappearing. Gervais 
has traced the dilution of language on abuse in TRIPS, and a review 
of the iterations of the IP chapter of the TPP show a similar process. 
While the TRIPS provisions have been repeated in the TPP, the 
United States and Japan resisted proposals supported by all other 
parties to the negotiation that would have inserted stronger language 
supporting States’ rights to address abuse of rights.214 IP chapters in 
U.S. bilateral trade agreements in the period 2000–2010 tended not 
to include general safeguards against abuse akin to those found in 
TRIPS Article 8 at all. 
Preventing abuse of enforcement procedures. 
A second kind of abuse recognized in TRIPS is abuse of process, 
specifically in Article 41.1: 
1.Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this 
Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against 
 
& Kimberlee Weatherall eds., forthcoming 2016) (arguing that this latter idea is 
consistent with TRIPS. Governments have discretion as to the direction of public 
enforcement resources, including prosecutor time, and most international 
instruments are quite explicit in affirming that international instruments do not 
create obligations to direct public law enforcement resources in any particular way: 
see TPP art 18.71.4 (stating that the IP chapter does ‘not create any obligation . . . 
with respect to the distribution as between the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights and the enforcement of law in general’, nor does it ‘affect the capacity of 
each Party to enforce law in general’). There is no specific principle in the TPP 
requiring non-discrimination in the application of public law enforcement 
resources. Similar provisions may be found in TRIPS art. 41.5 and ACTA art. 2.2. 
Nevertheless, we could expect that a State that prioritises certain kinds of 
copyright content over others in its prosecution decisions would be criticised, and 
part of the purpose here is to articulate the kinds of arguments that can be used to 
justify such decisions.) See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 21, at 289-91 (giving an 
alternate perspective on whether one emerging problem with TRIPS is a tendency 
of local prosecutors favoring local copyright owners). 
 214.  See June Park, Striking the Twenty-First Century Trade Agreement: The 
Case of Intellectual Property in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and US-Northeast 
Asian Economic Relations, OPEN FORUM May-June 2016, Vol.4, No. 3 (August 18, 
2015), http://www.theasanforum.org/striking-the-twenty-first-century-trade-agree 
ment-the-case-of-ip-in-the-tpp-and-us-northeast-asian-economic-relations/ 
(investigating the complexities in implementing the IP chapter of the TPP with 
respect to U.S. relations with Japan, South Korea, and China). 
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any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this 
Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and 
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These 
procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of 
barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their 
abuse.215 
A number of TRIPS provisions also allow for recovery by a 
defendant who suffers harm as a result of abuse of process. The most 
important provision in this context is Article 48, which provides that: 
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order a party at whose 
request measures were taken and who has abused enforcement procedures 
to provide to a party wrongfully enjoined or restrained adequate 
compensation for the injury suffered because of such abuse. The judicial 
authorities shall also have the authority to order the applicant to pay the 
defendant expenses, which may include appropriate attorney’s fees.216 
Abuse of process, like fair trial or due process, is a dynamic 
concept that is developed through application to particular sets of 
facts arising in particular proceedings. TRIPS expert and IP professor 
Daniel Gervais identifies a number of actions that might count as 
abuse of process: strategic lawsuits to gain an illegal or unfair 
advantage, or using procedures primarily for the purposes of 
obtaining information, or to force a settlement of an action where the 
other party cannot financially sustain the action.217 Other uses of 
 
 215.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1. 
 216.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 48 (providing for compensation, but notably 
lacking a requirement that a right vests in victims of enforcers before claiming 
against an enforcer who has abused enforcement procedures, unlike the 23 July 
1990 draft (W/76) of Article 48); see also Gervais, supra note 116, at 460 
(highlighting that the choice of the descriptor ‘abusive’ cases rather than 
‘unfounded’ cases, especially in light of the use of the descriptor ‘wrongful’ in 
other TRIPS articles, confines the application of Article 48 such that even a 
defendant that ultimately defeats the plaintiff is not by default entitled to Article 48 
protection). 
 217.  See Gervais, supra note 116, at 460 (explaining that abuse of procedures 
occurs when the circumstances and facts available to the plaintiff show that there 
has been a serious departure from reasonable use of the legal process); see also 
Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. [1977] 1 WLR 478 (UK) (discussing the notion that 
bringing proceedings for an ulterior, collateral advantage constitutes an abuse of 
process); see also Williams v. Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 (Austl.) (discussing 
whether bringing a case for an ulterior motive may be an abuse of process and thus 
undeserving of a decision on the merits); see generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 21, 
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enforcement procedures have been identified by domestic courts as 
abuses of process and may (on further research) provide a longer 
list.218 
Proving abuse of process can be a challenge; for example, in 
Anglo-Australian jurisdictions courts the heavy onus of proving a 
collateral purpose lies on the party alleging it.219 However, TRIPS at 
least makes it clear that judicial authorities must have the power to 
act and compensate a wronged party. While Article 48 is concerned 
with compensation, other responses are available to courts where 
processes are being abused.220 Furthermore, it is common at a 
domestic level for courts to stay proceedings found to be an abuse of 
process; alternatively, a court in a jurisdiction that applies the 
English loser-pays rule regarding legal costs might deny recovery of 
costs to a plaintiff that has engaged in abuse. 
The U.S. bilateral trade agreements of the 2000s tended to not 
include any references to abuse by IP owners or how States might 
respond to them. The obligation to implement procedures in a way 
that provides for safeguards against abuse is, however, part of the EU 
IP Enforcement Directive, and of ACTA and the TPP.221 
 
at 289-91 (providing first-person insight on the TRIPS negotiation proceedings 
particularly regarding forthcoming problems with enforcement, criminal 
jurisdiction, and civil and administrative remedies). 
 218.  E.g., Jones v. Sutton (No 2) [2005] NSWCA 203 (Austl.) (considering 
proceedings an abuse of process where parties sought to relitigate matters already 
finally determined by a court and limiting the recovery costs in abuse of process 
cases where the judgment amount and the cost of proceedings is significantly 
disproportionate); see Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. [1977] 1 WLR 478, 496 (UK) 
(finding abuse of process where parties seek to litigate a patent that will inevitably 
be held invalid). 
 219.  Goldsmith v. Sperrings Ltd. [1977] 1 WLR 478 (UK); Williams v. Spautz 
(1992) 174 CLR 509 (Austl.). 
 220.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 48 (stating that parties who have abused 
enforcement procedures may be ordered to compensate the injured party who was 
wrongfully enjoined or restrained, including defendant expenses). 
 221.  See EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 3(2) (obliging Member 
States to provide safeguards against the abuse of measures, procedures, and 
remedies); see also ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6(1) (requiring procedures be 
applied “in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade 
and to provide for safeguards against their abuse”); see also TPP, supra note 25, 
art. 18.71 (mirroring the language of ACTA and directing parties provide 
safeguards against abuse of procedures). 
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IV. TRENDS IN RELATION TO SAFEGUARDS, 
AND THE LEGAL (AND OTHER) IMPLICATIONS 
OF THOSE TRENDS 
In Part III, I identified and analyzed a series of safeguards in 
TRIPS and certain recent international instruments dealing with IP 
enforcement: both those that specifically limit the availability of 
processes or remedies, and those which empower States to actively 
frame procedures and remedies in order to achieve policy goals. 
These safeguards provide scope, to protect the rights and interests of 
individuals and companies that are objected to IP enforcement 
procedures, and, potentially, to promote underlying policy goals of 
IP rights, including user interests. In the course of that discussion, I 
noted that certain of these safeguards appeared to be under pressure, 
or were absent from one international text or another. I turn now to 
mapping these trends, and analyzing their legal effects. 
A. NOW YOU SEE THEM, NOW YOU DON’T: THE AMAZING 
DISAPPEARING SAFEGUARDS 
The best way to illustrate the changing position on defendant 
safeguards is visually. ANNEXURE 1 tabulates the trends, and makes 
for a striking picture. 
First, it demonstrates the extensive and detailed set of safeguards 
found in TRIPS. In academic writing about TRIPS, the enforcement 
provisions of TRIPS have often been remarked upon for their 
inclusion of detailed and strong procedures and remedies. As noted 
earlier in this paper, the inclusion of these provisions represented a 
significant departure from past treaties on IP protection, and an 
unusual incursion by an international law treaty into domestic court 
processes. What is less often the subject of comment is the way 
TRIPS mandates a reasonably comprehensive set of procedural 
safeguards, with rights to be notified of the basis of claims, rights to 
present evidence, to be heard, to be represented by legal counsel, and 
to appeal decisions on the merits.222 As this article has outlined, 
TRIPS’ safeguards are stated both at the level of principle, and in 
 
 222.  See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 21 (constituting an exception to this 
general rule in the literature, and discussing safeguards built into TRIPS by 
design). 
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very detailed and specific form. Subject to comments below 
regarding TRIPS’ more extreme remedies, TRIPS is conspicuously 
less interventionist when it comes to limiting remedies; for example, 
TRIPS leaves room for limits without mandating even basic 
considerations, such as proportionality except in certain confined 
circumstances or protection for innocent infringers (although there is 
nothing to stop a State considering such issues, especially given the 
significant discretion reserved to States in the application of 
remedies, as opposed to their availability). 
Equally striking is the absence of safeguards in AUSFTA, which 
acts here as an exemplar of the U.S. model bilateral agreement.223 
Admittedly, the AUSFTA section on enforcement is far from 
comprehensive; it contains no provision, for example, to require the 
presence of injunctions as a remedy. It would appear that, perhaps 
unlike later agreements like ACTA or the TPP, it did not aim at 
covering the field, but rather was focused on elaborations of 
particular articles of interest to the United States.224 But it does set 
out a range of procedures and remedies, and includes only a very 
limited number of TRIPS safeguards, such as the requirement of 
evidence and security to support both provisional and border 
measures.225 Overall, AUSFTA clearly deserves its reputation as a 
text aimed almost exclusively at the interests of right holders. This 
becomes even more striking when AUSFTA is compared side by 
side with the contemporaneous EU IP Enforcement Directive, which 
also aimed to raise and harmonize enforcement standards. By 
contrast with AUSFTA, the Directive contains an extensive set of 
safeguards, including TRIPS safeguards, and even expands on the 
TRIPS model by imposing some limits on remedies, particularly the 
 
 223.  I have not drawn a detailed comparison of the different U.S. trade 
agreements from the period 2000–2015 in order to determine (a) whether there has 
been any significant evolution in the U.S. model, or (b) whether individual 
countries incorporated additional safeguards into enforcement provisions in their 
negotiations with the United States. A full comparison is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 224.  See AUSFTA, supra note 36, art. 17.11 (requiring civil and criminal 
remedies including compensation for right holders, seizure of infringing goods, 
imprisonment, and monetary fines high enough to deter future infringement). 
 225.  See id. arts. 17.11.17, 17.11.19-20 (qualifying said requirements in that 
they shall not unreasonably block applicant’s recourse to procedures). 
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requirement that they be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.226 
ACTA and the TPP are interesting because they represent 
enforcement texts heavily influenced by U.S. demands, but in 
circumstances of plurilateral negotiations where American 
preferences were inevitably less likely to prevail. ACTA involved the 
EU, United States, and Japan as demandeurs of stronger procedures 
and remedies; the TPP included Japan and the United States, but not 
Europe.227 Looking at the table, the TPP includes a wide range of 
safeguards not found in past U.S. bilateral models, most of which 
have an equivalent in ACTA; in other words, we can clearly see the 
influence of ACTA in the TPP.228 Perhaps the most interesting 
developments lie in areas where ACTA safeguards are not found in 
the TPP: representing areas where U.S. demands were perhaps more 
pressing, or the absence of the EU was important. For example, 
where the ACTA applies the principle of proportionality to 
‘measures, remedies, and penalties,’ the TPP applies it only to 
remedies and penalties.229 This is an unfortunate retreat, given that 
there is no doubt that procedures, equally with remedies and 
penalties, can be disproportionate.230 Although not considered in 
 
 226.  See EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 3 (specifying that remedies 
must be applied without raising barriers to trade). 
 227.  See Emily Ayoob, Recent Development: The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 176 (2011) (recounting the history 
of ACTA negotiations including EU, Japan, and United States influences); see also 
Taylor Washburn, Getting Copyright Right in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 7 
YALE J. INT’L AFF. 117, 117 (2012) (listing then current members and likely new 
members, including the United States and Japan but excluding the EU). 
 228.  See infra annexure 1. This does not reflect any kind of change of heart by 
the US, whose early (leaked) proposals for the TPP did not include most of these 
safeguards but were based on the old U.S. bilateral model. Other countries, 
however, including Australia and New Zealand, appear to have drawn on the 
ACTA text during negotiations. See ACTA, supra note 23, art. 6(3) (mirroring the 
language of the TPP directing the parties to take into account the seriousness of the 
infringement, interest of third parties, and applicable measures, remedies, and 
penalties); see also TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71(5) (mirroring the language of 
ACTA directing parties to take into account the seriousness of the infringement, 
interest of third parties, and applicable measures, remedies, and penalties). 
 229.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.71(5) (stating as a general obligation that 
each Party should consider proportionality between the infringement and the 
applicable remedy and penalty). 
 230.  Indeed, the right of information (TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 47) is one of the 
few provisions in TRIPS to consider proportionality – and it is neither penalty nor 
remedy, but better described as a ‘measure’. 
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detail here, the expansion of criminal liability in the TPP compared 
to ACTA is also striking – and problematic.231 
The legal effect of failing to include mandatory TRIPS safeguards 
in these later instruments is limited.232 Many of the TRIPS safeguards 
omitted from the TPP text are mandatory rules in TRIPS,233 so they 
bind TPP parties despite their non-inclusion in the TPP text.234 In 
addition, TRIPS obligations generally are explicitly reaffirmed in the 
TPP,235 ACTA,236 and EU Directive.237 These later instruments 
expand the set of cases where remedies and procedures may apply: 
for example, from counterfeiting/piracy cases to all IP infringement 
cases; or from commercial scale infringement to all commercial 
infringement. They also elaborate on considerations relevant to the 
award of damages (such as consideration of retail price); and, in the 
case of seizure, expand the range of money and materials that can be 
seized or forfeited. But they cannot contract defendant safeguards. 
It is, nevertheless, odd that the safeguards have not been included 
in later texts. After all, many provisions from TRIPS are repeated 
across the instruments, and the imbalance in which provisions are 
and are not repeated is striking: exclusive rights are repeated; 
defendant and other third party protections are not. There is a striking 
contrast, too, with the EU IP Enforcement Directive, which includes, 
and even expands on, the TRIPS safeguards. It is legitimate to be 
 
 231.  See also Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An Alphabet Soup 
of Innovation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreements, 11 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 21, 25 (2013) (arguing that some requirements that provide for 
overbroad criminal remedies in the TPP and ACTA would punish even legitimate 
conduct). 
 232.  See Weatherall, Politics, Compromise, Text, supra note 30, at 259-60 
(discussing the debate on this point). 
 233.  See infra annexure 1. 
 234.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 1.2. (recognizing and affirming the parties’ 
intentions and obligations to coexist with existing international agreements). 
 235.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 1.2 (affirming explicitly each Party’s ‘rights 
and obligations with respect to the other Parties . . . in relation to existing 
international agreements to which all Parties are party, including the WTO 
Agreement’). 
 236.  See ACTA, supra note 23, art. 1 (emphasizing that obligations of Parties 
within ACTA shall not derogate those within existing agreements). 
 237.  See EU Directive 2004/48, supra note 22, art. 2.3(b) (noting specifically 
that the Directive shall not affect “Member States’ international obligations, 
notably the TRIPS Agreement”). 
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concerned that when it comes to safeguards, out of sight is out of 
mind. In the absence of the TRIPS protections, the later instruments 
might be interpreted as overriding them, or simply forgotten by 
States focused on the newest and most detailed rules. 
B. TENUOUS PROTECTION 
A second theme to emerge from the discussion above, and 
annexure 1 below, is that the international instruments provide 
principles that will enable the safeguard of defendant interests – but 
do not ensure such a result. The international instruments state 
principles of fairness, and frame most procedures and remedies to 
allow for decision-maker discretion in their application. Whether 
defendant users are treated fairly and equitably in practice, however, 
will depend on how that discretion is exercised. We are unlikely to 
see, and likely do not want, more detailed guidance on the exercise 
of discretion in the treaties themselves.  Respect for differences in 
system of justice, and the need to ensure room for dynamic 
development of concepts of fair trial and due process, limits our 
ability to usefully draft more specific protections for international 
instruments. The implication, nevertheless, is that we need to think 
about how else we can seek to inform the exercise of that discretion. 
This paper is itself a partial response. Mapping the safeguards that 
protect, or could protect, defendant interests in international 
instruments is one step towards defending the interests of users as the 
prospective or actual objects of legal procedures. Hopefully, such 
elaborations can assist court systems with less experience. Where 
particular remedies are new, the mapping presented here could assist 
local legislatures, executive, and courts by providing guidance on 
some of the issues that can arise in relation to certain remedies. 
Further elaboration on safeguards could also help where States are 
under pressure to increase action against IP infringement. The United 
States has a history in trade negotiations of seeking guarantees from 
other States, that certain remedies are not only available, but also 
applied in practice.238 The articulation of internationally accepted 
 
 238.  See AUSFTA, supra note 36, art. 17.117(b) (providing a striking textual 
example that allows Australia to eschew statutory damages, but also states that ‘if 
such additional damages . . . are not regularly awarded in proceedings involving 
deliberate acts of infringement where needed to deter infringement, that Party shall 
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limiting principles is one tool for assisting States to withstand this 
kind of pressure.
 239 
A second key source of guidance in this respect is the actions and 
applications of rules at a domestic level. The more we unearth and 
highlight the measured approach real courts often take in the pursuit 
of justice and fairness, the more we can develop a narrative 
protective of defendant and user interests. Ideally, this will help 
counter a one-eyed ‘policing and deterrence’ narrative that otherwise 
dominates international and policymaker discussion, and empower 
other courts and decision-makers to focus on a fair trial and due 
process. 
C. EXCEPTIONAL OR ORDINARY? 
A final discernible evolution is the way that newer international 
instruments are arguably normalizing remedies which, in TRIPS, 
were exceptional and draconian.240 One example of this trend is the 
 
promptly ensure that such damages are regularly awarded or establish a system of 
pre-established damages’ (emphasis added)). 
 239.  There are limits to this argument. Excepting perhaps within the EU via a 
claim concerning compliance with the EU IP Enforcement Directive, it would be 
difficult to enforce a State’s obligation to provide sufficiently ‘fair’ IP enforcement 
procedures. It would be similarly difficult to claim that a State had been too harsh 
on defendants, unless such harshness was somehow coupled with a claim for 
nationality-based discrimination.  See US-China Panel Report, supra note 75, at ¶ 
7.513  (emphasizing what is already clear from the text of TRIPS: that the 
enforcement provisions of TRIPS give considerable leeway to States in 
implementation); see also Appellate Body Report, United States - Section 211 
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, ¶¶ 215-16,WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) 
[hereinafter Havana Club] (defining ‘available’ as ‘having access’ and 
acknowledging the wide variety of civil judicial procedures among Members). 
 240.  This assertion begs the question what remedies or procedures would count 
as ‘extraordinary’. It is not possible here to elaborate further on exactly which 
remedies or procedures are extraordinary, or not, since such an assertion requires 
far more detailed engagement with domestic developments in a range of 
jurisdictions both in IP and beyond. However, provisional measures (discussed 
here) are not the only remedies or procedures provided for in various international 
IP instruments that may warrant designation as ‘exceptional.’ Pre-fixed damages, 
also known as statutory damages may be another example of a fairly 
‘extraordinary’ remedy.  A brief review of the U.S. Code suggests that such 
damages are relatively rare and more commonly set at a much lower level than is 
found in the U.S. Copyright Act.  However, further research and comparisons with 
other countries are required to confirm this.  See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 504 
(1976) (defining ‘copyright’ and prefixing damages ranging from $100 to 
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provisions relating to provisional measures. It is widely 
acknowledged that provisional measures warrant particular scrutiny, 
especially when they involve the seizure of alleged infringing goods 
or other evidence. Such orders have the potential to be especially 
disruptive to affected businesses, and, if granted ex parte, are open to 
abuse.241 
Article 50 TRIPS requires that judges have authority to order 
‘prompt and effective’ provisional measures to preserve evidence, 
and to prevent infringement.242 Article 50 does not in terms state that 
such measures (or any subset of them) are confined to extreme cases. 
But the text is hedged about with restrictions and safeguards which 
strongly suggest that the remedy, especially when ordered inaudita 
altera parte, is to be considered exceptional. The applicant for a 
measure can be required to provide evidence, not just of 
infringement, but enough for judges to satisfy themselves of 
imminent infringement ‘with a sufficient degree of certainty.’243 The 
applicant can be required to provide security ‘sufficient to protect the 
defendant and to prevent abuse.’244 The defendant has a right to a 
review, measures must cease to have effect if proceedings are not 
initiated, and there is provision for compensation for any injury.245 In 
relation to orders inaudita altera parte, TRIPS identifies limited 
circumstances where this might be appropriate: ‘where any delay is 
likely to cause irreparable harm to the right holder, or where there is 
a demonstrable risk of evidence being destroyed.’246 
 
$150,000). 
 241.  See Universal Thermosensors Ltd. v. Hibben [1992] 1 WLR 840 (UK) 
(finding that an injunction restraining a defendant from dealing with customers 
when there was a misuse of information should not go beyond what is required to 
protect the plaintiff); see also Columbia Picture Indus. Inc. v. Robinson [1987] Ch 
38 (UK) (emphasizing that ex parte applications for an Anton Piller order requires 
disclosure of all relevant matters); see also Lock Int’l Plc. v. Beswick [1989] 1 
WLR 1268 (UK) (holding that an employer must be specific as to the range of 
what is being protected as a trade secret when it seeks to prevent a former 
employee using information obtained during his employment). 
 242.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50.3 (specifying that authorities may require 
applicants produce any readily available evidence to show infringement or 
imminent infringement, to provide security, and to prevent abuse). 
 243.  TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50.3. 
 244.  See id. 
 245.  See id. arts. 50.4–50.8. 
 246.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50.2. 
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By contrast, Article 18.75 of the TPP is much less hedged about. 
The TPP requires that ‘Each Party’s authorities shall act on a request 
for relief in respect of an intellectual property right inaudita altera 
parte expeditiously.’247 Unlike TRIPS, the TPP does not make any 
mention when such orders might be appropriate. Judicial authorities 
may require evidence and security against harm, although in the TPP, 
the security ‘shall not unreasonably deter recourse to those 
procedures.’248  But none of the other safeguards are present in the 
TPP: no right of review; no requirement that the measures be 
revoked or cease to have effect; no provision to grant defendants 
compensation.249 Further, the TPP text explicitly requires that judicial 
authorities have the power to order the most extreme version of a 
provisional order to preserve evidence or prevent infringement, 
which is not required by TRIPS: the provisional ex parte order for 
seizure or other taking into custody of suspected infringing goods, 
materials and implements relevant to the infringement, and 
documentary evidence relevant to the infringement.250 
A similar evolution may be seen in the provisions on border 
measures. Border interception in defense of private rights is 
 
 247.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.1. 
 248.  See id. art. 18.75.2. 
 249.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.3 (lacking said safeguards with author 
suggesting that the power to order compensation to a wrongly restrained defendant 
is implicit in the provision of security.  If this were true, however, TRIPS would 
then not require reference to compensation, since TRIPS also includes the potential 
for the court to require security sufficient to protect the defendant’s interests). cf. 
ACTA, supra note 23, art. 12 (falling somewhere between TRIPS and the TPP by 
retaining more of TRIPS safeguards but adding some of the TPP qualifications. 
ACTA art. 12 specifies when provisional measures might be appropriate and also 
provides for compensation to a defendant where no infringement is subsequently 
found. But, like the TPP, it also requires that the provision of security should not 
deter recourse to provisional measures, and does not make provision for revocation 
of provisional measures within any fixed period). 
 250.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.3; see also TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 50 
(missing specific reference to impoundment of infringing goods and implements. It 
is perhaps arguable that such orders could fall within the concept of measures to 
preserve evidence, in which case the various safeguards provided within article 50 
would apply. However, TRIPS art. 50 would be satisfied if a member state granted 
courts the power to order a party to retain or not destroy or not sell infringing 
material: such a limited approach to the preservation of evidence would not satisfy 
the TPP); compare ACTA, supra note 23, art. 12.3 (which has similar drafting to 
the TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.75.3). 
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unusual,251 and the TRIPS provisions on border measures252 are 
confined to trademark counterfeit goods and copyright piracy.253 A 
right holder applicant must be required to provide ‘adequate’ 
evidence of prima facie infringement,254 and can be required to 
provide security sufficient to protect the defendant and the competent 
authorities and to prevent abuse.255 TRIPS states that proceedings on 
the merits must be commenced within a particular time period256 and 
that there must be provision for compensation to importers and 
others harmed by suspension of goods.257 
 
 251.  Impoundment of goods at the border to enforce private rights is rare: in 
fact, in Australia this only occurs in relation to certain kinds of intellectual 
property. Seizure and impoundment at the border does occur to enforce public laws 
in Australia: seizure of goods without a warrant is allowed. See Customs Act 1901, 
§ 203CB (Cth) (Austl.) (allowing seizure of goods without a warrant); see also 
Customs Act 1901, § 183UA (including narcotic goods, prohibited psychoactive 
substances, and prohibited serious drug alternatives); see also Customs Act 1901, § 
203 (including alleged IP infringements as goods that may be seized without a 
warrant on the basis of a Notice of Objection lodged with customs); Customs Act 
1901, § 203B (relating to ‘special forfeited goods’); see also Customs Act 1901, § 
203C (relating to narcotic goods, giving some indication of the kinds of serious 
infractions that can lead to instant, ex officio, and warrantless seizure by customs); 
see also Customs Act 1901, § 203T (including moveable cultural property among 
other provisions allowing for seizure). What is striking about these provisions is 
the seriousness of the offenses that may lead to seizure of goods at the border: in 
allowing for such a remedy, IP law is placed in company with drug and national 
security offences and special cases like cultural property: see generally Annemarie 
Bridy, Carpe Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War on Piracy, 
46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 683 (2014) (discussing another link between IP enforcement and 
drug enforcement). 
 252.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, arts. 51–60. 
 253.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 51 (noting that Members are allowed to 
extend the measures beyond these cases and to other IP rights, provided similar 
safeguards are provided); see also TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 53 (qualifying this rule 
by providing that goods allegedly infringing on designs, patents, layout designs or 
trade secrets must be released after a certain period unless a judge makes the order 
requiring their continued suspension). 
 254.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 52 (requiring further that a right holder 
provide detail description of goods making them readily recognizable by customs 
authorities). 
 255.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 53. 
 256.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 55 (limiting detention of goods to ten days, 
with a possible extension of ten more days, when proceedings leading to a decision 
on the merits have not been initiated). 
 257.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 56 (giving relevant authorities the power to 
order indemnification of importer and owner of goods following a wrongful 
detention of goods). 
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Again, the TPP text has ‘evolved’ from TRIPS. The TPP extends 
such measures to cases of trade mark infringement, not only 
counterfeiting.258 The TRIPS requirement that proceedings on the 
merits be commenced within a particular timeframe is not included. 
Although the TPP is more specific on what may be done with 
infringing goods, including destruction, plus mechanisms for 
administrative penalties or sanctions including fines,259 there is no 
reference to compensation for a wronged importer or consignee. The 
non-inclusion of a series of safeguards in the TPP text changes the 
tone of the provision entirely, and communicates the impression, at 
least, that remedies of this kind should be considered an ordinary tool 
within the enforcement toolkit available to a right holder. This is 
undesirable if we wish to ensure that exceptional remedies are 
applied with care, and appropriate safeguards.260 The evolution of IP 
enforcement provisions may make this harder – while these 
exceptional remedies are heavily qualified in TRIPS, the 
disappearance of safeguards highlighted above tends to detract from 
any suggestion that certain remedies might not be appropriate in the 
ordinary case. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has sought to explore user interests beyond the usual 
focus on exceptions and limitations, delving into the apparently 
prosaic area of remedies and procedure. As I have argued, if we wish 
to promote user interests within IP systems, we must engage equally 
across the full range of issues in the IP system – including 
enforcement. These aspects of the legal system will affect whether 
users can fight for their rights, or must rationally fold at the threat of 
litigation. I have also identified and analyzed the various safeguards 
 
 258.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.76.1 (requiring Parties to provide 
applications to suspend or detain suspected counterfeit or confusingly similar 
imported mark or good). 
 259.  See TPP, supra note 25, art. 18.76.6-7 (requiring parties to authorize 
administrative penalties and destruction of goods upon a determination of 
infringing goods). 
 260.  See Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 284, 307 (2015) (recommending that U.S. legislation 
specifically provide that certain ex parte seizure provisions are extraordinary, 
while simultaneously arguing that ex parte seizure for alleged trade secrets 
breaches are inappropriate). 
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found in certain key international IP instruments, and mapped their 
development over time. The overall picture is a complex one. There 
is certainly a very strong foundation for due process and appropriate 
and just remedies laid out in TRIPS; many of the procedural 
safeguards are mandatory and hence persist despite TRIPS’ 
displacement with bilateral and plurilateral agreements, and both 
States and courts have the freedom within the architecture of the 
provisions to frame remedies in a way that promotes the full range of 
IP policy goals. However, there are also risks; for example, that 
safeguards will not be used out of neglect, intimidation or 
contestation from IP owner stakeholders, or simple lack of 
awareness, or even that States will fail to take full advantage of the 
flexibilities in enforcement just as too many have in the enactment of 
substantive IP law post-TRIPS. I hope that this paper will be one 
small contribution to ensure that this part of the flexibility of the IP 
system is remembered, used, and further developed. 
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ANNEXURE 1: CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF 
DEFENDANT SAFEGUARDS IN INTERNATIONAL 
IP ENFORCEMENT INSTRUMENTS 
Notes: 
Numbers indicate the articles/provisions where relevant safeguards 
may be found. A dash indicates that the safeguard is not present. 
* indicates a safeguard which is mandatory in TRIPS. ‘Mandatory’ 
includes where TRIPS requires that judicial or other authorities ‘shall 
have authority’ to make certain orders. 
 
SAFEGUARD TRIPS 
(1995) 
AUSFTA 
(2004) 
IPRED (2004) ACTA 
(2010)  
TPP 
(2015) 
INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES 
Objective that 
enforcement 
should contribute 
to promotion of 
innovation and 
technology transfer  
7 - Innovation (no ref 
to technology 
transfer)
261
 
Recital 1, art 18 
2.3 (incorporates 
TRIPS art. 7) 
18.2 
Members may 
adopt measures to 
protect public 
health and 
nutrition  
8.1 - 
-
262
 
2.3 (incorporates 
TRIPS art. 8.1). 
Also Doha 
Declaration 
recognized in 
Preamble. 
18.3. 
Also art 18.6 
recognizes 
Doha 
Declaration. 
 
 261.  Reference to technology transfer is clearly less critical and appropriate 
within the EU, which is comprised of developed countries. 
 262.  Concerns about public health are ordinarily more associated with 
developing countries (such as, for example, via the Doha Declaration). See Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1 
[hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights] (simply stating that intellectual 
property shall be protected without mentioning safeguards); see also EU Directive 
2004/48, supra note 22, ¶ 32 (aligning with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union with respect to intellectual property specifically). 
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Recognize the 
need to facilitate 
diffusion of 
information, 
knowledge, 
technology, culture 
and the arts  
- - - - 18.4 
Recognizing the 
principles of 
transparency and 
due process  
- - - - 18.4 
Taking into 
account interests of 
relevant 
stakeholders, 
including right 
holders, service 
providers, users 
and the public 
- - - Some reference 
to interests of 
third parties and 
consumers: 
recital 24 
18.4 
FAIR AND EQUITABLE PROCEDURES GENERALLY 
Fair and equitable 
IP enforcement 
procedures* 
41.2 - 3.1 6.2 18.71.3 
Decisions on 
merits in writing 
and reasoned 
41.3 17.11.29 - - 18.73.1 
Decisions based 
only on evidence 
on which parties 
are heard* 
41.3 - - - - 
Review of 
decisions (judicial/ 
administrative)* 
41.4, 50.4, 55 Appeal from refusals 
to register TM only: 
17.2.7 
7 (measures to 
preserve evidence), 
9 (prov. measures) 
- Appeal from 
refusals to 
register TM 
only: 18.23(d) 
Written and timely 
notice of the basis 
of the claims* 
42 - - - - 
Right to 
independent legal 
counsel* 
42 - EU Charter of 
Fundamental 
Rights
263
  
art. 47 
- - 
Right to 
substantiate claims 
and present 
evidence* 
42 - - - - 
Production of 
evidence to the 
43.1 - - - - 
 
 263.  See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (stating the 
fundamental rights protected in the EU. The Charter was proclaimed in 2000, and 
became legally binding on the EU with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
in December 2009. The Charter applies when EU countries adopt or apply a 
national law implementing an EU directive, including the IP Enforcement 
Directive. The Charter is referred to in Recital 32 of the IP Enforcement 
Directive). 
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other side* 
Proportionality of 
procedures 
Only in 47 
(right of 
information) 
- Required: 3.2 Considered: 6.3 - 
LIMITS ON REMEDIES (GENERAL) 
Limits on 
availability of 
injunctions where 
injunction is 
inconsistent with 
Member’s law 
44.2 n/a  
(no requirement re 
injunctions) 
-  8 18.74.2 
Proportionality of 
remedies (at least a 
consideration) 
Only in 46, in 
application 
(destruction of 
implements) 
- Required in 
application: 3.2 
Considered in 
implementing: 
6.3 
Considered in 
implementing: 
18.71.5 
Requirement that 
remedies/
procedures be 
effective
264
 
41.1 - Required in 
application: 3.2 
6.1 18.71.1 
Protection for 
privacy / 
confidentiality 
42, 43, 57 17.11.12 only 
(sanctions for 
violation of orders 
protecting 
confidentiality) 
6, 7, 8 4, 11, 22 18.74.13, 
18.74.14, 
18.76.4.  
Seizure of 
materials & 
implements used in 
infringement – 
only where 
predominantly 
used in creation of 
infringing goods 
46 17.11.10 
Use in creation & 
manufacture, not 
predominant use. But 
for © piracy and TM 
counterfeiting only 
10 
principle use in 
creation & 
manufacture only, 
but all IPR 
infringements 
10 
predominant use 
only; pirated 
copyright and 
TM 
counterfeiting 
only 
18.74.12 
any use in 
creation or 
creation of 
infringing 
goods, any IPR 
PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
Court power to 
require sufficient 
evidence before 
order made* 
50.3 17.11.17 9.3 12.4 18.75.2 
Court power to 
require security to 
prevent abuse and 
protect defendant* 
50.3 17.11.17 9.6 12.4 18.75.2 
Requirement that 
provisional 
measures expire if 
proceedings not 
pursued within 20 
working days* 
50.6 - 7.3, 9 - - 
Compensation for 
costs or harms 
50.7 - 7.4, 9.7 12.5 Compensation 
only for abuse 
 
 264.  See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 41.1 (stating “Members shall ensure that 
enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as 
to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property 
rights covered by this Agreement”. ‘Effective’ here is both a required (effective 
enforcement must be provided for) but also a limit (Parties would not be required, 
under this provision, to provide remedies or procedures that would be futile)). 
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caused by 
provisional 
remedies * 
of procedure: 
18.74.15. 
BORDER MEASURES 
Required only for 
counterfeit TM and 
pirated copyright 
goods 
51 17.11.19 
Extended also to TM 
infringement 
EU Customs 
Regulation 4 
available for 
infringement of all 
IPRs 
13 
Extended, with 
parties required 
not to 
‘discriminate 
unjustifiably’ 
between IPRs 
18.76 
Extended also 
to TM 
infringement 
Authorities must 
require sufficient 
evidence before 
seizure* 
52 17.11.19 EU Customs 
Regulation 6, 17 
17.1 18.76.2 
Authorities’ power 
to require security 
to prevent abuse 
and protect owner/ 
importer of goods* 
53 17.11.20 EU Customs 
Regulation 6.3(o) 
undertaking 
18 18.76.3 
Requirement that 
border measures 
expire if 
proceedings not 
commenced within 
10 days 
(extendable once)* 
55 - EU Customs 
Regulation 23.3–
23.5
265
 
- - 
Compensation for 
costs or harms 
caused by border 
measures*  
56 - EU Customs 
Regulation 28;
266
 
also 30 (penalties) 
- - 
ABUSE 
Recognition of 
possible need for 
State action to 
prevent abuse of 
rights
267
 
8.2 - - 2.3 (incorporates 
TRIPS art. 8) 
18.3.2 
      
 
 265.  Note that the EU Customs Regulation has an additional step however: once 
goods are seized, the importer/owner is notified and must, within 10 days, notify 
customs of their objection to destruction. If they fail to do so they may be deemed 
to have consented to destruction without any determination of infringement: 
23.1(c). 
 266.  Within the EU IP Border Measures are dealt with via regulations separate 
to the EU IP Enforcement Directive: Regulation (EU) No 608/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 June 2013 concerning customs 
enforcement of Intellectual property rights and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1383/2003, OJ L 181/15 (29.6.2013). 
 267.  Note that it is not surprising that abuse of right does not form part of 
instruments concerned chiefly with enforcement, such as the EU IP Enforcement 
Directive. 
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Reference to action 
to prevent abuse of 
procedures/
process* 
41, also 63, 67 - 3.2 6.1 18.71.1  
Compensation for 
abuse of 
procedures* 
48 - - - 18.74.15 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Limits on 
applicability of 
criminal law: 
willful, 
commercial scale 
copyright piracy 
and TM 
counterfeiting only 
61 17.11.26 
extended to 
significant non-
commercial 
infringement, and any 
commercial 
infringement 
[not addressed] 23 
extended to 
commercial 
activities for 
direct or indirect 
economic or 
commercial 
advantage 
18.77 
extended to 
acts for 
commercial 
purposes, and 
significant 
non-
commercial 
acts with 
substantial 
prejudicial 
impact 
 
 
